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ABSTRACT
BEYOND THE POSTMODERN IMPASSE 
OF CONTEMPORARY COMPOSITION:
THE NON-FOUNDATIONAL ALTERNATIVE 
OF DEWEYAN PRAGMATISM
by-
Donald C. Jones 
University of New Hampshire, September, 1996
In their critique of the autonomous individual of foundationalism, 
postmodernists have rejected the epistemological assumption that a knower 
directly perceives reality in thought then expresses these perceptions through 
language. Yet as these theorists have asserted the influence of language upon 
an individual's thinking, they have been unable to explain an individual's 
agency - - the ability to create, assert, examine, and m aintain/ or modify a 
belief. Once considered to be situated in prior discourses, the individual has 
been conceived as a postmodern subject dominated by language. Yet the 
subject's ability to influence as well as be influenced by discursive practices 
has not been explained by postmodern theorists. An impasse has been 
reached as the previous explanation of an individual's agency has been 
rejected yet no tenable alternative has been advanced.
Within contemporary composition studies, this postmodern emphasis 
on language's influence upon thought has led to an epistemological divide 
between those writing pedagogies which are believed to assume an 
autonomous foundational author and those that acknowledge a writer's 
discursive position. Yet this divisive categorization risks rejecting the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
valuable writing process practices of Donald Murray and Peter Elbow because 
their pedagogies have been miscast as individualistic, neo-Romantic 
expressivisms. Fortunately, a reconsideration of Murray's and Elbow's process 
pedagogies is already underway; Thomas Newkirk, Stephen Fishman, and 
others have started to articulate what Janet Emig first termed John Dewey's 
"tacit tradition" within writing process theories. As this dissertation defends 
Murray and Elbow by reconceiving them as pragmatist composition theorists, 
this tacit tradition will resound in its relevance because Dewey's pragmatic 
philosophy also draws a direction beyond the postmodern problem of agency.
Deweyan pragmatism can explain an individual's agency - - the ability 
to create, assert, examine, and m aintain/or modify her beliefs - - even as it 
acknowledges discursive influences upon those beliefs. By reconceiving such 
fundamental philosophic terms as experience, knowledge, and language, 
Dewey provides an alternative, non-foundational account of agency as well as 
a theoretical explanation of the best practices of writing process and 
postmodern composition instruction. This dissertation reconstructs and 
synthesizes writing process and postmodern pedagogies beyond the impasse 
over agency.
viii
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INTRODUCTION
1
Mo one has ever claimed it is easy to read John Dewey's most mature 
philosophical thought. As he tries to overcome philosophical problems that 
have confounded twentieth century thinkers, Dewey sometimes writes with 
the convoluted syntax of a nineteenth century man. Yet his prose is no more 
difficult to read than that of Jacques Derrida, and like this later, postmodern 
critic of foundationalism, Dewey disrupts and reconceives the very terms of 
the philosophic discussion.
In a witty criticism, Randolph Bourne once observed, "No man . . . 
with such universally important things to say . . . was ever published in 
forms more ingeniously contrived to thwart [publicj interest." Dewey is 
never as fluid a writer as William James, but he was capable of passages of 
equal eloquence. He, for example, asserts, "[If nature were] a closed 
mechanical or closed teleological structure . . . the flickering candle of 
consciousness would go out" and "The saint sits in his ivory tower while the 
burly sinners run the world." Yet those who seek the philosophic importance 
of Dewey's writings must look on a larger scale than the sentence or the 
phrase. For Dewey reconceived such fundamental terms as experience, 
knowledge, and language in order to create a new, comprehensive framework 
for philosophy.
Once when Dewey was attending a gathering with several of his 
Columbia University students, someone complained about the difficulty of 
comprehending his philosophy. In response, Dewey gestured towards his
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
students and said, "Let some of these young men explain me: it will make a 
career for some of them." The teller of this tale and one of Dewey's students, 
Irwin Edman, then concludes: "It did." Edman, Sidney Hooks, and others 
devoted their considerable careers to explaining the implications of Deweyan 
pragmatism. I believe Dewey's value as a philosopher lies in the synergy of 
the principles of his non-foundational thought; their whole exceeds their 
parts. Yet, Dewey too often has been analyzed and applied in piecemeal 
fashion, and the results can be disastrous as the example of progressive 
education demonstrates.
Through the power of thought and text, I want to cross the distances 
of time and place in order to join the circle of students to which Dewey left 
his legacy to be determined. I want to consider the significance of the whole, 
rather than a part, of Dewey's non-foundational philosophy in order to 
resolve the epistemological problems that divide contemporary composition. 
When I began writing this dissertation, my goal was not so ambitious; I 
planned to use pragmatism to create an alternative perspective upon the 
writing process theory of Donald Murray. Using Dewey, I wanted to disrupt 
the predom inant criticisms of Murray which present him as a neo-Romantic 
"expressivist." Unlike most composition scholars, I had read some of 
Dewey's educational philosophy before 1 encountered Murray's writing 
process theory so I considered his composition theory from a different, 
Deweyan viewpoint. Because I immediately discerned the pragmatism 
implicit in his pedagogy, I resisted the neo-Romantic critiques. I believed they 
distorted Murray's pragmatist principles, and the best aspects of his pedagogy 
had to be defended since I found them to be very effective with first year 
college students.
2
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As I read about the pedagogical alternatives offered by M urray's critics, I 
became both more confused and more committed to my dissertation topic 
because the specific practices advocated by these supposedly more social 
theorists resembled what I considered to be the most effective elements of 
Murray's process pedagogy. As explained in chapter five, even the concept of 
writing as a process has been claimed by Murray's critics as their own 
profound insight! I then realized a pragmatist synthesis of writing process 
and postmodern composition instruction was possible, and it was much 
needed if the best aspects of writing process and those of postmodern 
instruction were to be preserved. For postmodern theory can not explain the 
best practices of its own composition practitioners. In theory, postmodernists 
can not account for a writer's agency. After critiquing the foundational 
concept of agency which taught student writers to think then write, 
postmodernists can not provide an alternative explanation of an individual's 
ability to create, assert, examine, and m aintain/or modify a belief. Once 
postmodernists declared the influence of discourse upon an  individual's 
thinking, they have not formulated a theory of how one can deliberately 
influence as well as be influenced by discursive practices. But Dewey has.
When I understood the postmodern problem of agency, my 
dissertation suddenly expanded from an impassioned, pragm atist defense of 
Murray's process pedagogy to a Deweyan reconstruction of contemporary 
commposition theory and practice. For Deweyan pragmatism can explain an 
individual's agency - - the ability to create, assert, examine, and m aintain/or 
modify her beliefs - - even as it acknowledges discursive influences upon 
those beliefs. Of course, w hat I intuited in a moment required months of 
reading and drafting be articulated in chapter three. In order to reconstruct
3
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contemporary composition, I have ventured much further into several areas 
than I originally anticipated. Rather than begin a pragmatist defense of 
Murray with the discrepancies between his writing process theory and what 
his critics claim he states (now included in chapter four), I start by presenting 
the problem of agency and its importance to contemporary composition 
practices in chapter one. I link this theoretical impasse to the troubling 
practices of Lester Faigley's and James Berlin's postmodern pedagogies, then I 
examine the incomplete efforts by several theorists to overcome this problem.
In chapter two, I trace the path of this composition problem to its 
theoretical origins in structuralism and poststructuralism. I have limited my 
discussion of the postmodern theories of Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, 
and Michel Foucault to the problem of agency, but I have relied upon existing 
scholarship to show that I am not the first person to discern the shortcomings 
of these theorists when they try to account for individual agency. I consider 
chapter three to be the most important one of this dissertation because Dewey 
reconceives the basic terms of philosophy and a reader's failure to understand 
Dewey's non-foundational reconception of philosophy thwarts the pragmatist 
reconstruction of writing process pedagogies in chapter four and its synthesis 
with postmodern composition instruction in chapter five. In chapter three, 1 
establish the pattern of explaining Dewey's reconception of experience, then 
knowledge, then language, and finally agency. Yet as I begin by asserting the 
primacy of experience, I have been careful to avoid presenting experience as a 
prior absolute, a first cause. Instead I stipulate, "Dewey's concept of experience 
. . . cannot be comprehended fully until his concept of language is also 
understood." In chapters four and five, I follow this sequence of Dewey's 
reconceptions of experience, then knowledge, language, and agency in order
4
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to reconstruct and synthesize writing process and postmodern composition 
instruction as a pragmatist pedagogy. In the final chapter, I am trying to 
present the pedagogical possibilities of a Deweyan composition course so that 
contemporary theorists and practitioners can follow this new direction 
beyond the problem of agency.
5
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CHAPTER I
6
WHAT DO THE 'GOOD FENCES'ACROSS THE HELD 
OF COMPOSITION STUDIES 'WALL OUT' ?
"Reform movements are notoriously ahistorical."
- - Lawrence Cremin
"John Dewey is everywhere in our work."
- - Janet Emig
Product. Process. Cognitive Research. Social Construction. Expressive. 
Epistemic. These labels, often paired in binary opposition, dominate too 
much of the recent history of composition studies. Like the "good fences" of 
Robert Frost's poem "Mending Wall," these taxonomic terms can be used to 
organize the field of composition. Yet we should not erect these barriers too 
readily, and we should never act as though they are set in stone. Like Frost's 
narrator, we need to pause and ponder his question: "Before I built a wall I'd 
ask to know/W hat I was walling in or walling out." When the complexity 
and the diversity within a category of composition theories are reduced to a 
single term, such as "product" or "current-traditional," then this discipline 
dismisses too much of its rich history. As the first sentence of The 
Development of Writing Abilities prophetically warns: "We classify at our 
peril" (1). 1
As recent reformers have announced their new directions for 
composition studies, they usually have erected these perilous fences and 
reduced the past to "a monolithic tradition" deserving dismissal (Meyers 154). 
For example, at the start of the modem writing process movement, Ken
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Macrorie attacked those "deadly things called themes . . . [written with] a 
dehydrated academic tongue" to make a decisive break with the previous 
emphasis on the written product (vii). Donald Murray's 1972 article entitled 
T each Writing as a Process, not Product” provided the divisive slogan of 
this movement. When Janet Emig's The Composing Processes of Twelfth 
Graders transformed the advances of writing process advocates into an 
agenda for cognitivist researchers, she likewise declared product-oriented 
writing instruction to be "pedagogically, developmentally, and politically an 
anachronism" (Composing 100, see Faigley Fragments 30).
By defining their new movement in opposition to a reductive, hence 
ahistorical, version of the past, writing process theorists replicated some of 
the very problems they sought to resolve. As product-oriented instruction 
ignored h o w  the desired product was to be produced, writing process 
pedagogy initially concealed what  the desired product was. As student 
writers learned "the way language works in us," Ken Macrorie assumed good 
writing would result from this "freeing . . .  [of the students'] natural powers of 
language and perception" (telling 4, vii). These writers would write well 
naturally; no one would have to explain the desired features of the final draft. 
Students would not need to read the exemplary texts of published authors 
because, as Donald Murray declared, "process can not be inferred from 
product any more than a pig can be inferred from a sausage" (Learning 18). 
Subsequent warnings by Ann Berthoff and Thomas Newkirk to consider 
product and process dialectically, rather than dichotomously, have been 
heeded only slowly. 2
As cognitive researchers and social constructionists have announced 
their own successive reforms of composition studies, they too have 
reductively critiqued the predecessors against whom they have defined
7
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
themselves. Cognitivist theorists have conceived of writing process theories 
as entirely natural and spontaneous as they have presented a more 
mechanical and deliberate model of the composing process. To critique the 
writing process "metaphor of discovery," Linda Flower and John Haves, two 
leading cognitivist researchers, have had to ignore Donald Murray's assertion 
that "a writer must plan and calculate, scheme and decide . . . mak[e| a 
thousand executive decisions" (Flower and Hayes 21, A Writer 6). By 
countering the incomplete, language-centered writing process theories with a 
more mind-oriented, cognitive model, Flower, Hayes, and their colleagues 
have provided a useful schema of the factors that contribute to a writer's 
derisions. Unfortunately, they have been no more able than their writing 
process predecessors to explain the reasons a writer makes a particular 
decision during composing.
To explain a writer's particular derisions, social theorists argue that a 
writer's position within discourse communities must be considered because 
expectations for writing are socially constructed. Unlike their writing process 
predecessors who explain a writer composing within a large, implicit 
language group, social theorists emphasize the differences between smaller, 
explicitly distinguished discourse communities. David Bartholomae, for 
example, highlights the differences between academic and personal 
discourses in order to help disadvantaged student writers learn to "invent 
the university," to participate in the community of academic discourse(s) 
which is more compatible with the family language of their more privileged 
peers (134). Through this emphasis on diverse academic and cultural contexts, 
Bartholomae situates each writer in one or more discourse communities 
marked by power relations.
As Bartholomae and his colleagues take this "social turn" toward
8
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"post-process, post-cognitive theory," James Berlin and Patricia Bizzell have 
'walled out' too much of the complexity and the diversity of writing process 
and cognitive process theories (Trimbur 108, 109). In a series of influential 
analyses, Berlin criticizes the writing process concept of a writer because it 
slights the importance of language and "denies the place of the 
intersubjective, social processes" of composing (Rhetoric and Reality 146). 
Berlin contends that this concept of a writer depends on the expression, or the 
pressing out, of an "internal apprehension" of truth from a prior, absolute 
self so he categorizes writing process theories as "expressive" ("Contemporary 
Composition" 771).
From  this questionable epistemological analysis, Berlin further argues 
that these individualistic composition theories can be "easily co-opted" by 
capitalism which, as a professed Marxist, he opposes ("Rhetoric and Ideology" 
487). The writing process emphases, such as on originality and self-discovery, 
reinforce the capitalistic principles of initiative and personal responsibility. 
For example, when Peter Elbow advocates writing process techniques like 
freewriting to enable students to "take more control over their own lives" by 
"gain[ingj control over words," Berlin objects that this individualistic 
emphasis precludes the effective collaboration and cultural criticism 
necessary for true freedom (Writing Without Teachers vii). Yet Berlin's 
criticisms ignore the intersubjectivity suggested by writing process theorists. 
Elbow acknowledges a writer's transactional relationship with a reader when 
he asserts, " You can't give readers a finished product . . . any more than a 
playwright can send a live play through the mail," and freewriting assumes 
the influence of language upon an individual writer: "You stand out of the 
way and let the words be chosen by the sequence of the words themselves" 
(Writing  315, 16). Similar to Elbow, Donald Murray describes the
9
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intersubjective quality of composing through his concept of a writer's "other 
self" that anticipates the possible public responses to a text (Learning 167). 
Stephen Fishman and Lucille McCarthy recently have asserted that students 
in an "expressivist" classroom do collaborate to a much greater degree than 
Berlin ever recognizes ("Community" 71).
Because his theories of composing have been read reductively and 
dismissively, Peter Elbow opposes the label "expressivism." He considers it 
to be a "hostilely motivated" term, originating with those who seem to want 
to "wipe out" writing process theorists ("Uses" 69 and 76, n. 16). 1 also reject 
the "expressivist" label as reductive, hence ahistorical, so I refer to Elbow and 
Murray as writing process theorists. 1 distinguish them from Linda Rower 
and John Hayes by referring to the latter as cognitive process theorists, a term 
taken from one of Flower and Hayes' major articles entitled "A Cognitive 
Process Theory of Writing." 3 Bizzell, like Berlin, faults both writing process 
and cognitive process theorists for being "inner-directed," meaning they 
concentrate on a student's presumed innate and universal language 
capabilities. Bizzell instead advocates "outer-directed" social theories that 
consider a student's language-thinking capacities to be fostered by, and 
functioning within, particular discourse communities ("Cognition" 215). 
These "outer-directed" theorists emphasize the influences of, and the 
conflicts between, discrete discourse communities which process and 
cognitivist theorists minimize. They, therefore, deem no writer a 
modernist island, capable of detached, objective contemplation of the world 
beyond the self.
Because of their rejection of modernist assumptions, social theorists 
like Berlin, Bizzell, and Bartholomae are often labeled as postmodernists or 
poststructuralists. 4 As the term postmodernism itself suggests, these
10
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theorists have shifted composition 'away7 from more individualistic concepts 
of a writer who supposedly uses language for self-expression. Yet at this 
supposed critical distance 'after7 writing process and cognitive process 
theories, these theorists still position themselves by referring 'back' to the 
rejected beliefs of modernism found in their reductive criticisms. Like their 
predecessors, these postmodern theorists have positioned themselves in 
relation to what they are moving away from as much as towards, and this 
retrospective critique has led contemporary composition into what another 
leading social theorist, Lester Faigley, terms the "postmodern impasse" 
(Fragments 20). This apparently unresolvable problem involves an 
individual's agency, the ability of a speaker or writer to create and assert 
certain beliefs. This impasse, as its etymology suggests, leaves a postmodern 
writer in a theoretical 'blind alley' from which no advance, or even regress, 
seems possible.
The Postm odern Impasse
Postmodernists oppose the autonomous individual of modernism 
because, as structuralists and poststructuralists, they believe the individual is 
situated w ithin prior discourses. They indicate this opposition by referring to 
the 'individual' as the 'subject7 (Berlin "Poststructuralism" 18). The 
postmodern usage of this word, however, often conflates its original 
meaning of a subordinate person (from the Latin snbjectus: sub - under; 
jectus - thrown) with the concept of the sovereign self it is supposed to 
oppose, as in "poststructuralists have systematically deconstructed all 
received notions of the subject" (Burke 106, iVIartin Jay qtd. by Burke 106). This 
paradoxical usage typifies the complexity of a postmodern subject being 
situated in prior discourses.
11
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When the subject is situated "among many competing discourses that 
precede the subject," Faigley cautions, "the notion of 'participation' becomes 
problematic in its implication that the subject can control its location and 
moves within a discourse" (Fragments 226-27). This questioning of an 
individual's ability to control his or her position within various discourses 
raises the perplexing issue of agency for postmodern theorists. Unlike 
Kenneth Burke's use of this term in his theory of the pentad where it refers to 
the means used to achieve a desired end, agency, for postmodernists, relates 
to their concern whether individuals have any control over their means and 
ends. As Rebecca Howard explains,
It has become commonplace for rhetoricians to engage in the question 
of agency in the subject . . . .  Can w'riters control their writing processes 
or are their writing processes - - and indeed the writers themselves - - 
constructed by their cultural settings? (349)
In his award winning Fragments o f Rationalitij, Faigley reluctantly assumes 
the latter, at least, in theory. And, because he assumes "the subject is an effect 
rather than the cause of discourse," the postmodern concept of subjectivity 
becomes a debilitating pun (9). An individual writer must be conceived as an 
object subjected' to the dom inant, and dominating, discourses that 
determine the beliefs formed and asserted (Fragments 139). Yet, as Faigley
himself admits, this theoretical conclusion is contradicted by his own reading 
of several students' essays in which he grants them some agency. After 
Faigley analyzes their texts, he asserts these students are "more aware of how 
agency can be constructed from multiple subject positions than are many 
theorists" (224). Because postmodern theory cannot adequately account for 
the practices of successful writers, contemporary composition instructors face 
an impasse, a blind alley’ from which we currently know not where to turn
12
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in theory or in practice. The current confusion over a writer’s relationship 
with language must be resolved because it has created the pedagogical 
extremes of a postmodern denial of student writers’ thoughts and an 
uncritical acceptance of their every word.
Agency and Authority in the Postmodern Classroom
Because they locate individual writers within prior discourse, Faigley 
and Berlin have made some troubling assumptions about what composition 
students can, and should do, with language. Some instructors, like Faigley, 
revel in the fact that their students are inscribed by language, and they 
celebrate this inscription without sufficiently questioning it. Other 
instructors, such as Berlin, revile the influence of the dominant discourses 
upon students, and they oppose the hegemonic culture with revolutionary 
alternatives. Unfortunately, these postmodern practices have questionable 
consequences for the agency of students and the authority of the instructor.
To oppose the foundational concepts of language as neutral and of 
individuals as autonomous, Faigley advocates the "the achieved utopia of the 
networked classroom," but the actual results are far from ideal (Fragments 
163). As explained in Fragments, Faigley replaces the conventional class 
discussion with electronic mail exchanges to produce a collective text. These 
fragmentary, simultaneous comments, Faigley contends, disrupt "the 
conventions of turn-taking and topical coherence" that he incorrectly 
associates with all oral discussions (168). By claiming that every conventional 
classroom discussion consists of a linear pattern of teacher to student and 
student to teacher, Faigley tries to ascribe the success of some of these 
exchanges to their medium, the electronic forum (180). He, however, ignores 
the productive, decentered dialogues that the best conventional classroom
13
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conversations can foster in order to advance his electronic alternative.
The transcript of the first exchange concerning gender roles shows that 
some students do "negotiate . . . [different] meanings with other students" 
and "try on and exchange identities . . . even from one message to the next" 
(185, 191, and see 170-78). Yet the computer network cannot be entirely 
responsible for these successes if it does not preclude other failures. In what 
Faigley initially terms his "worst" computer conversation, his students resist 
any meaningful discussion then resort to intolerant invective and inflexible 
opinions in order to avoid critical thought and constructive engagement 
(192-7). One student, self-identified as "armpit," comments, "isn't this so 
fun. let's not talk about the reading!!!" and another denounces a classmate as 
"a FEMALE cha[u]vinist pig" (193, 195). Despite the claims to the contrary, 
this utopia has not been achieved. Faigley frankly admits the failure of these 
students and others to negotiate their different discursive practices, but his 
zeal for these computer conversations makes him lapse into a relativism 
which undermines his students' agency (189).
Not only do these students fail to develop the agency with which to 
articulate, defend, and modify their beliefs, but their instructor denies his 
own agency as well by abrogating his authority. Rather than address his 
students' unproductive and even objectionable discussion or take some credit 
for the much better exchange by another class, Faigley demurs, "I cannot 
defend these labels [for the worst’ and 'best' discussions] because in both 
classes students claimed and used classroom space for their own purposes" 
(197)! The postmodern concept of language as endless signification 
apparently makes Faigley leery of interrupting the flashing display of 
electronic messages. He tolerates the unexamined opinions of students like 
those identified by the self-selected pseudonyms of "A. Hitler" and "armpit"
14
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(172, 193). He also overlooks the crucial catalysts provided by a teaching 
assistant, JoAnn Campbell, during the "best" conversation; her provocative 
questions stimulate several of the the most productive exchanges (169,178). 
By his failure to question the students' objectionable assumptions and 
provoke insightful responses, Faigley fulfills his own postm odern skepticism 
about individual agency.
Through this enervating relativism, Faigley's netw orked classroom 
duplicates a weakness found within some writing process theories. Like Ken 
Macro rie in one of his first texts entitled Up taught, Faigley encourages "the 
sensational rush over the considered response" as James Vopat prescientlv 
warned at the inception of the modern writing process movement (42). This 
common problem again suggests that writing process and postmodern 
theories are not as mutually exclusive as Berlin, and Faigley himself, 
contend. 5
Rather than abrogate a postmodern composition instructor's authority, 
James Berlin aggrandizes it as he tries to resolve the impasse over agency in 
practice. In Berlin's experimental course, his postm odern assumptions 
require an instructor to ultimately dominate the students, and their passivity 
prevents the development of any agency as writers. "Given the ubiquitous 
role of discourse in human affairs," Berlin reasons, "instructors cannot be 
content to focus exclusively on teaching the production of academic texts . . . .  
We must take as our province the production and reception of semiotic 
codes" ("Poststructuralism" 24). As explained in "Postructuralism, Cultural 
Studies, and the Composition Classroom,” Berlin "refigures English studies 
along the lines of cultural studies" by engaging his students in collaborative 
learning sequences (26). Using the principles of deconstruction, Berlin 
teaches his students to identify the ever shifting binary oppositions within
15
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texts and to consider the consequences of privileging, for example, masculine 
over feminine in a tacit hierarchy (see 26-32).
Through this identification of these implicit values, Berlin hopes, 
"students who can demystify the subtle devices of persuasion in these 
cultural codes will be motivated to begin" participating in the development of 
"more democratic and personally humane economic, social, and political 
arrangements" (27). Although Berlin explicitly states, "students do not always 
submit to these codes," he conceives of the dominant discourses as an 
oppressive obstacle which students must overcome (30). He expects his 
students to "challenge the dom inant ideological formations" and to "resist 
and negotiate these hegemonic [cultural] codes" (26, 27). When most of 
these students' experiences are considered products of the dom inant ideology, 
this rhetoric of resistance, however, leads to a postmodern form of paralysis. 
The desired resistance against the hegemonic culture deprives these students 
of enough background knowledge with which to consider specific assertions.
As these students are deprived the necessary background for individual 
agency, Berlin believes the postm odern instructor must "problematize" the 
cultural codes that "students bring to college by placing their signifying 
practices against alternatives" (31). Alan France, another postm odern 
composition theorist, makes explicit that these alternatives are provided by 
the instructor; he advocates the use of "principled critical intervention" to 
correct a student's naive view concerning, for example, the purposes of 
imprisonment (550). This imposition by a supposedly neutral, non­
authoritarian instructor, however, interferes with the continuing process of 
learning for the sake of an immediate product. When Berlin and France 
demand students challenge the dominant ideology, these students often 
resist not the privileged discourses, but their composition instructor.
16
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
According to Bizzell, Berlin’s experimental course fails to achieve its 
stated goals. When Berlin, for example, "asks students to deconstruct 
dominant ideologies on relations between the sexes . . . .  [they] hold firmly to 
the ideologies they are supposed to question. [Both female and male students) 
defend prostitution as a woman's right to make money any way she sees fit" 
(Bizzell "Beyond" 670)! Like Bizzell, I believe the bitter medicine of this 
postmodern pedagogy is too much for Berlin’s students to swallow. 
Resistance against presumably oppressive discursive practices requires most 
students to doubt too much of their previous knowledge. As Bizzell explains, 
many students have already experienced this pervasive skepticism "in the 
[mass media's] hip smirk of passive detachment . . . and they don 't like it" 
("Beyond" 671). Quoting Jackson Lears, she adds, students dislike this 
postmodern suspension of belief because, on some level, many already 
comprehend the consequences of uncommitted skepticism: "blase self­
containment" (qtd. in "Beyond" 671).
As these postmodern instructors abrogate or aggrandize their authority, 
their students have difficulty developing the agency with which one asserts, 
examines, defends, and revises one's beliefs. Because of these pedagogical 
problems, other postmodern and feminist theorists have addressed and 
begun to resolve this impasse over agency. These partial solutions mean that 
this quandary, in both theory and practice, can and should be avoided.
Some New (and Old) Directions beyond the Impasse
To avoid this impasse over agency, the premises of postmodernism 
that created it need to be reconsidered. In contrast to the dichotomv assumed 
by structuralist and most poststructuralist theorists, Mikhail Bakhtin creates 
an alternative, dialectical relationship between society and the individual. As
17
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Don Bialostosky explains in "Liberal Education, Writing, and the Dialogic 
Self," Bakhtin's concept of the dialogic self describes an individual who can 
can develop the agency of forming "internally persuasive discourse" which 
Bakhtin distinguishes from "authoritative discourse." The latter discourse 
creates a distance between rhetor and audience; it is to be received and 
repeated without question. Internally persuasive discourse, in contrast, is 
neither self-validating, nor self-generated. It is instead, "half-ours, half-
someone else's . . . .  it organizes masses of our words from within and does
not remain in an isolated and static condition . . . .  it enters into 
interanimating relationships with new contexts" (Bakhtin qtd. Bialostosky 
15). This discourse creates contact between speaker and listener, writer and 
reader; it responds to what has been or may be said by others.
In contrast to postmodern theories of discourse in which they are
believed to "contain within them all the possibilities of utterances," Bakhtin’s 
concept of heteroglossia gives an individual voice only their "occasions and 
provocations" (Bialostosky 19, 20). Our identities form and continue forming 
through our dialogue with others and among our own varied discourses; 
thus, the self is dialogic. As an individual deliberately selects and tests "new 
[discursive] ways of seeing and saying," agency can be developed (17). In order 
to develop agency, student writers need to be protected temporarily from the 
cacophony of the competing viewpoints, lest they become overwhelmed by 
authoritative discourse. Vet to be able to participate in the ongoing dialogue, 
student writers need to listen to "some sample of its voices;" their voices 
depend upon "whom they have heard of and whom they have heard o u r  
(21, 14). Yet Bakhtin's theory of "internally persuasive discourse" does not 
offer a complete account of individual agency because he assumes that every 
voice is equally available for the student writer to hear. Bakhtin does
18
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acknowledge the ideological import of discourse, but he does not address the 
marginalization of certain discourses examined by Michel Foucault in his 
historical studies of discursive practices and power relations. The dialogic self 
cannot anticipate and respond to voices unheard.
To hear voices silenced by the dominant discourses, the radical 
educators Ira Shor, Henry Giroux, and Nan Elsasser advocate Paulo Freire's 
theory of critical literacy. This literacy program affirms the students' own 
experiences and deconstructs the discursive practices that marginalize certain 
voices. Its goal is critical consciousness, the awareness that language 
constitutes, not merely names, a particular cultural reality’ and each person 
is a dialectical participant in the existing social order and can be an agent in its 
reform. In Freire's native Brazil, the peasants in this program learned they 
had the agency with which to voice their desires for democratic equality. In 
the United States, Linda Shaw Finlay and Valerie Faith have adapted Freire's 
critical literacy to help underachieving college students overcome their 
unproductive assumptions about language and writing. These students 
developed a critical awareness of their participation and potential agency 
within the discursive formation of their cultural 'reality' (75). Yet this 
pedagogical success surpasses its theoretical origin. For Freire, the fruition of 
his students' critical literacy comes when they realize the dominant, capitalist 
ideology is a distortion of the true reality revealed by Marxism (Bizzell 
"Marxist" 64). Yet for Finlay and Faith, their students' agency is not measured 
by their commitment to Marxism.
A third and final example of a partial resolution of the postmodern 
impasse is the feminist theorist Dale Bauer's revision of postmodern agency 
to include more than the resistance theorized by Foucault and sought in 
practice by Berlin. In addition to critiquing the dominant discourse and
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conceiving of alternatives, Bauer believes students need to to learn "how to 
belong, how to identify, as well as how to resist" if they are to accept 
alternatives, such as her own feminist principles (391). Based on Kenneth 
Burke's rhetorical theory, Bauer encourages her students to engage in 
"identificatory readings" of feminist literary texts (391). Through this process 
of identification, an individual faces a decisive confrontation between two 
previously accepted values, and Bauer hopes, an individual learns to adopt 
the alternatives conceived through critical consciousness. Yet by disavowing 
any closure to her feminist composition course, Bauer mitigates the agency 
she theorizes and teaches. She claims, "These classes, indeed perhaps 
feminist pedagogy and rhetoric in general, end ambivalently: these disrupted 
values or assumptions are not occasions for reconstituting consciousness 
into clear categories of . . . good and bad politics" (394). Like Faigley in his 
networked classroom, Bauer lapses into an enervating relativism that 
precludes much of a collaborative effort for greater gender equality against 
continuing patriarchal dominance; she hesitates before imposing her desired 
alternatives which Berlin risks.
A lthough each of these reconsiderations of postmodernism impasse 
avoids some of the theoretical premises of the current impasse (the 
dichotomy of society and the individual, the silencing of alternative voices, 
and the paralyzing emphasis on resistance), none creates a complete account 
of agency. Nor does there seem to be any recourse to previous composition 
theories of agency. If Berlin's and Bizzell's criticisms of writing process and 
cognitive process theories are accepted, then any possible regress away from 
this impasse along these previous approaches has been blocked. Fortunately, 
an even older blueprint of the postmodern impasse already exists, one that 
will allow contemporary theorists to recover that which is valuable from
20
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dismissed writing process and cognitive process theories as well as redirect 
composition studies.
"From that which is rejected"
Postmodernist theorists -- as they currently influence contemporary 
composition -- cannot direct any advance beyond the impasse over agency 
because they "take [their| clew . . . from that which is rejected" rather than 
"positively and constructively . . . [developing theirj own philosophy" (Dewey 
Experience and Education 20 and see Newkirk more 187). In Experience and 
Education, John Dewey specifically offers this caution to progressive educators 
who never implemented fully, or even seemed to understand completely, his 
pedagogical principles. When considered in the larger context of Dewey's 
pragmatic philosophy, this criticism reveals the source of the postmodern 
impasse. As these social theorists critique the modernist author specifically 
and foundationalism in general, they have "take [their] clew . . . from that 
which is [to be] rejected." Deweyan pragmatism, in contrast, can provide a 
theoretical account of individual agency because this philosophy has been 
"positively and constructively" developed.
Until recently, the academic and political marginalization of 
pragmatism after Dewey's death has prevented many contemporary readers 
from realizing the full relevance of this non-foundational philosophy. Yet, 
like the literary theorist Giles Gunn, I believe that Deweyan pragmatism will 
prove to be the "most intellectually resilient American response to the 
quicksands and carapaces of cultural postmodernism" as well as, I will add, 
the impasse over agency within contemporary composition (7). Through his 
pragmatist reconstruction of foundational philosophies, Dewey identifies and 
replaces the false dualisms of society and the individual, language and
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thought, and structure and agency which have trapped modernist, 
structuralist, and postmodernist thinkers. By reconstructing these false 
dualisms, this dialectical philosophy provides a coherent conceptual system 
that can guide contemporary composition beyond the postmodern impasse. 
This redirection of contemporary composition based on Deweyan 
pragmatism is already underway -  although very quietly.
In 1980, Janet Emig identified Dewey as one of several seminal 
thinkers whose "tacit tradition[sl" w ithin composition needed to be fully 
articulated (Michael Polyani qtd. on 150). Thomas Newkirk has continued 
this gradual realization by asserting, "Dewey articulated many of the cardinal 
principles of the writing process" (more 206). Newkirk explains the 
following pragmatist precepts using numerous quotations of Dewey: "the 
constructive model of thought; the primacy of experience; the social nature of 
learning; the relationship of classroom learning to democratic values," and 
these principles are related, by a few references, to James Britton, Donald 
Murray, Donald Graves, C. H. Knoblauch and Lil Brannon (m ore  206). 
Without further analysis of these writing process advocates, this insightful 
explication of Dewey's relevance, however, has been overwhelmed by critics 
of writing process theorists. This dissertation, therefore, will redress these 
criticisms as part of its larger project to redirect contemporary composition.
Recently, Stephen Fishman has extended Newkirk's careful reading of 
Dewey with a detailed analysis of Elbow's writing process theory. Like 
Newkirk, Fishman believes that "the Deweyan tradition" provides the 
"philosophic roots" of modem writing process theories ("Explicating" 316). 6 
After examining Dewey's conceptions of education, community, and 
perception, he applies these concepts to the example of one student named 
Ramona engaging in peer response and multiple draft revision. Fishman's
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article and other recent essays co-authored with Lucille McCarthy do not 
articulate, and  probably cannot within the limited length of journal articles, 
Dewey's thorough non-foundational reconstruction of philosophy and its 
problematic terms. This dissertation, therefore, will extend the efforts by 
Emig, Newkirk, Fishman, and others to articulate the tacit tradition of 
Deweyan pragm atism  within writing process theories.
I consider the postmodern impasse of agency to be one of those 
primarily theoretical problems that, I hope, will soon be seen in retrospect 
with incredulity. This problem will some day seem as distant and ridiculous 
as the apocryphal story of three Cartesian philosophers trying to determine 
the num ber of teeth in a horse’s mouth. The first two were devout 
rationalists, faithfully trying to deduce the correct num ber from various first 
principles. The third, a more secular character, was looking out a window 
disinterestedly until he saw an actual horse in the courtyard. Suddenly he 
suggested, "Why don’t we open the horse’s mouth and count the teeth 
inside?" The first two Cartesians quickly dismissed this absurd suggestion 
and returned to their deductions from absolute principles. Although the 
third philosopher soon lapsed into unknown reveries, the inductive 
thinking based on empirical details represented by his suggestion was to 
transform Europe during the Enlightenment. Yet within this admittedly 
apocryphal story, the first two rationalists cannot conceive of actually 
counting the horse's teeth even after it has been suggested to them.
As shown in this introduction, the theoretical problem of the 
postmodern impasse does influence the practices of contemporary 
composition. Like the rationalism of these apocryphal philosophers, 
postmodern theory influences the problems considered significant and the 
solutions deem ed conceivable by many contemporary composition theorists.
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It is my hope that this study will lead not only to a better historical 
understanding of composition's recent past, but in the spirit of Deweyan 
reconstruction of knowledge, this project will also look towards this 
discipline's future beyond the postmodern impasse. A future, I want to 
demonstrate, in which the supposedly contradictory pedagogies of writing 
process and social epistemic instruction can be even more than "good 
neighbors." Using Deweyan pragmatism, I plan to dismantle rather than 
rebuilt again the divisive boundary between these two pedagogies so student 
writers can learn to achieve greater non-foundational agency.
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CHAPTER ONE NOTES
1. Taxonomic terms can make useful distinctions. For example, James 
Britton and his co-authors created the categories of expressive, poetic, or 
transactional writing to serve as "a possible means towards [greater) 
understanding" (198). The reduction, however, of these distinctions to 
formulaic assignments — explicitly opposed by the authors — demonstrates the 
perils of classification (198). Reductive labels are often applied when a new 
theory of writing is advanced. For example, when Daniel Fogarty wanted to 
trace the "roots of a new rhetoric" in 1959, he coined the term "current 
traditional" which many have applied to the nineteenth century theories of 
Barrett Wendell, John Genung, and A. S. Hill (118). Hill certainly seems to 
deserve this label when he does not require rhetoric to ”fumis[h] a person 
with something to say . . . [only] how best to say [it]" (The Principles o f 
Rhetoric qtd. in Young 29). Yet Hill also defies this categorization when he 
insists that students should not "hide [their] poverty of thought in [the] 
finish of style" (Our English 89). He seems positively progressive when he 
laments the "dreary" language of themes and advocates self-selected topics so 
students can "put forth their full powers" in "free and natural expression" 
(96, 93). The 'current-traditional' category not only treats Hill, Genung, and 
Wendell in a reductive manner, but as Lucille Schultz also objects, this label 
has obscured the diversity of nineteenth century writing instruction (10).
2. In The Making o f Meaning (1981), Ann Berthoff warns, 'Teaching process 
does not require that we ignore the product, only that we see it as a dynamic 
result, a coming into being" (22). In more than stories (1989) , Thomas 
Newkirk similarly asserts that although Donald Murray "has written that we 
cannot infer the process from the p roduct,' a pig from a sausage.' My guess is 
that we do this all the time" (180).
3. In contrast to Berlin, Susan Jarratt considers the advances and the 
complexities of writing process theories in her article "Feminism and 
Composition: The Case for Conflict" published in Contending With Words.
4. Like its theory of meaning, the term postmodernism itself is is unstable 
and heteroglossic. As Lester Faigley explains so well in the introduction of 
Fragments o f Rationality, postmodernism can refer to three metadiscourses 
about 1) literature and art, 2) philosophy, and 3) the social history of 
capitalism (6). W ithin contemporary composition, postmodernism is often 
used as the preferred synonym for poststructuralism, yet postmodernism is a 
broader term that includes both the structuralist and poststrucuralist critiques 
of modernism (see chapter one).
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5. Faigley’s abrogated authority and his students' attenuated agency stem in 
part from his conflation of the networked classroom's collective text and the 
"multiple agencies and origins" of discourse identified by Derrida ("Freud" 
226). This collective text written by m ultip le  students is not the same as the 
"overlapping and competing discourses" in which each student is situated 
(16). Thus, the technology of Faigley’s electronic discussions can no more 
guarantee each student will confront and critique their fragmented and 
contradictory subjectivity than a stimulating conventional classroom 
conversation can prevent it. In his otherwise penetrating survey of of 
postmodernism, Faigley fails to question the paradox of the networked 
classroom: in lieu of direct oral interactions, Faigley advocates the 
technological separation of subjects because it fosters more hum an contact 
between them.
In a subsequent chapter, Faigley includes the following quotation by the 
postmodernist thinker Jean Baudrillard: "Just look at the child sitting in 
front of his computer at school; do you think he has been made interactive, 
opened up to the world? Child and machine have been merely joined 
together in an integrated circuit" (qtd. on 209). Yet he fails to consider this 
telling quotation in relation to his own networked classroom. Although 
Faigley connects postmodernism to late capitalism's hyperreality, his 
enthusiasm for these electronic discussions is uncharacteristically uncritical 
and apolitical. For example, he also states, "Networked writing displaces the 
modernist conception of writing as hard work aimed at producing an 
enduring object. Acts of networked writing are most often quickly produced, 
quickly consumed, and quickly discarded" without questioning the 
desirability of this postmodern perspective (191).
6. Fishman also notes recent studies by John Trimbur, David Russell, and 
Louise W. Phelps that examine Deweyan pragmatism as one of several 
influences on contemporary composition studies.
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CHAPTER II
BEYOND THE POSTMODERN IMPASSE: 
REJECTING THE CLUES OF FOUNDATIONALISM
'T here  is always the danger in a new movement that in rejecting the 
aims and methods of that it would supplant, it may develop 
its principles negatively . . . .  Then it takes its clew . . .  from 
that which is rejected instead of from the constructive 
development of its own philosophy." - - John Dewey
T he concept of the author is never more alive than 
when pronounced dead.” - - Sedn Burke
Like a hiker backtracking to find a missed turn, contemporary 
composition theorists need to retrace the steps that have brought them to the 
postmodern impasse over agency. As structuralist and poststructuralist 
theorists have critiqued foundationalism, they have identified the theoretical 
path they no longer want to follow, yet they have been unable to reach a 
tenable theory of non-foundational agency. 1, therefore, refer to these 
thinkers as postmodern anti-foundationalists. The findings of their 
incomplete critique too often have been repeated without question or 
rejected out of hand. Roland Barthes' seminal structuralist essay, for 
example, has "been accepted unreflexively [by its supporters] . . . without 
[having his] arguments . . .  held up to any critical scrutiny," or "it has seldom 
provoked more than derisory dismissal from its opponents" (Burke 21). A 
careful and rigorous retracing of the structuralist and poststructuralist 
critiques of foundationalism by Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Michel
Foucault, however, will reveal their missteps towards the postmodern
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impasse and the possible pragmatist recourse beyond this predicament.
Structuralist and postststructuralist theorists have underm ined the 
foundationalist concept of agency by questioning the foundational concepts of 
reality, knowledge, and language upon which it depends. Foundationalists, 
from Plato to John Locke, have believed that thought precedes language 
because thought is assumed to be a direct and unmediated apprehension of an 
antecedent and ultimate reality. The mind, Richard Rorty explains, is 
conceived according to an ocular analogy. Just as the body's eye perceives 
physical appearances, the mind is believed to 'see' this prior reality (38). If a 
knower passively perceives an antecedent reality, then it is not altered by 
being known, and knowledge is not affected by its expression. Thought 
represents reality, and language represents thought. According to this 
representational theory, language is a neutral, transparent medium for the 
expression of thought. A word in language is believed to have one-to-one 
correspondence with an aspect of reality.
Although modernist writers, such as Ernest Hemingway, doubt the 
foundational reality has stable order, they still believe an individual is capable 
of autonomous, objective contempla-ion of the chaotic world beyond the self. 
For example, in A Moveable Feast, Hemingway presents himself as the 
expatriate in Paris who writes in unheated garrets or in uncrowded cafes. 
The scene of his writing is one of physical isolation, and each day it begins by 
"writ[ing| the truest sentence that you know . . . .  startjingl with the first true 
simple declarative sentence" (12). The problem with this depiction of 
composing is that it makes "transcription a synecdoche of writing" (Brodkey 
398). It treats one part, the writing down of words, as though it represents the 
whole of composing; it suppresses the social aspects of composing that
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influence a writer even as he or she is physically isolated from others. Based 
on these foundational conceptions of reality, thought, and language, student 
writers have been instructed to 'think then write,' and the composing process 
has been limited to thinking, perhaps outlining, then writing.
Structuralist theorists, such as Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Levi- 
Strauss, have rejected these foundational concepts and have sought to 
supplant them with postmodern alternatives. De Saussure, for example, has 
challenged the assumed transparency and the neutrality of language by 
reconceiving words as arbitrary signs. According to structuralism, these signs 
consist of a signifier and a signified, and they function within a contextual 
network. Each sign is meaningful because of its difference, its contrast with 
other signs. A spoken or written signifier suggests a signified based on these 
differential relationships, not because of its direct correspondence to a 
particular aspect of foundational reality. Levi-Strauss has analyzed the 
systematic pattern of oppositions found in myths, narratives, and languages. 
These binary oppositions, he argues, not only influence the assertion of 
meaning but also the very development of meaning, consciousness, and 
identity. A writer, therefore, does not simply express an original idea after an 
acute perception of reality. Developed in opposition to foundationalism, 
structuralism has successfully criticiqued the previous concept of agency. 
Unfortunately, it also leads to the current impasse as Jacques Lacan and 
Roland Barthes demonstrate.
Using Freud's analysis of dreams, Jacques Lacan denies that self­
reflexive agency can be achieved. As shown by dreams, language involves 
the condensation and displacement of meaning on an unconscious level. The 
speaking subject enters a social position through language, yet the
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unconscious distortions of meaning prevent this location from being
critically self-examined. The translated title of a 1957 article by Lacan
epitomizes the problematic implications of the structuralist critique: 'T he
Agency of the Letter in the Unconsciousness, or Reason Since Freud" because,
within this title, agency is not even ascribed to the individual, but to the
"letter[s|" of language. This postmodern skepticism towards individual
consciousness becomes absolute when Roland Barthes executes this
modernist theory of authorship in his seminal essay appropriately entitled
T he Death of the Author.’’
Because he assumes the structuralist axiom that "it is language which
speaks, not the author," Barthes' argument ultimately goes astray, yet this
misdirection suggests an alternative premise essential to a tenable theory of
non-foundational agency (50). To execute the m odernist author upon whom
a conventional critic depends for textual closure, Barthes employs a twofold
argument. First, he "suppresses] the author in favor of writing" meaning
language, and second, he ”restor[es] . . .  the reader's place" (50). To suppress
the modernist concept of authorship, Barthes asserts,
We now know that a text consists not of a line of words, releasing a single 
theological’ [or absolutel meaning (the ’message’ of the author-God), but 
of a multi-dimensional space in which are married and contested several 
writings, none of which is original: the text is a fabric of quotations, 
resulting from a thousand sources of culture . . . .  [a w riter’s! sole power is 
to mingle writings. (52-53)
Through this structuralist reconception of the text, Barthes reduces the 
significance the m odernist author. If "a text consists of multiple writings,’’ 
then a writer merely quotes and "mingles" many prior "sources of culture" 
(54). Through this reversal of the foundational precedence of the individual 
know er/w riter to language, Barthes tries to restore the reader's relevance to
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textual interpretaton. He argues, the "site where this multiplicity is 
collected . . .  is not the author, as has hitherto been claimed, but the reader ' 
(54). It is the reader/ critic who creates an interpretation. Yet as a critique of 
the modernist author, of definitive textual criticism, and ultimately, of 
foundationalism, Barthes' argum ent "take[s its] clew" from the foundational 
conception of writers and readers as two distinct entities -  only one of whom 
produces meaning. It is this foundational clue that leads Barthes astray.
When Barthes tries to de-emphasize the privileged writer, he assumes 
he "must reverse the myth: the birth of the reader must be requited by the 
death of the Author'" (55). Because Barthes has not rejected the foundational 
conception of writers and readers, he tries to "reverse" the hierarchy which 
privileges the writer. He overlooks New Criticism's previous methodological 
exclusion of the author, such as by the intentional fallacy, and creates an 
ominpotent author capable of absolute meaning. Then Barthes can employ 
the structuralist conception of language to execute the author and restore the 
reader. As Sean Burke notes, Barthes "does not so much destroy the 'Author- 
God', but participates in its construction. He must create a king worthy of the 
killing" (26). This argument, however, depends upon Barthes’ flawed analogy 
between an author and an om nipotent God.
Unlike the Christian concept of God, there are alternative theories of 
authorship with which it is possible "without contradiction, to conceive of 
authors . . . who do not hold a univocal mastery over their texts," such as 
Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogic concept of the self (Burke 25). Yet Barthes does 
not consider any of these alternatives, and this failure has a tragic effect on his 
stated desire of seeing the reader reborn. When Barthes wields the stucturalist 
concept of language to kill the "Author-God," he announces, the reader is the
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very space in which are inscribed, w ithout any of them being "lost, all of the 
citations out of which a writing is made; the unity of a text is not in its 
origins but in its destination, but this destination can no longer be personal ; 
the reader is . . . only that someone who holds . . .  all of the tracesfrom which 
writing is constituted" (54). Yet, due to the structuralist priority of language 
to an individual, the reader which Barthes hopes to deliver from the grasp of 
the "Author-God" is stillborn. Instead of being the passive recipient of a 
modernist's author text, Barthes' reader is a receptive destination point for 
the system of language and its individual utterance.
By placing both the writer and the reader within a prior language 
system, Barthes denies both any agency; each becomes a passive conduit of 
discourse. Barthes' misstep reveals that an adequate account of agency must 
include a transactional conception of writers and readers as well as a 
Bakhtinian dialectic between these individuals and their society's language. If 
Barthes had considered another, less divine, concept of authorship, he could 
have conceived of a collaborative relationship between a writer and a reader 
which grants both limited agency within a language system. Yet in order to 
conceive of such collaborative agency, Barthes cannot accept "that which is [to 
bej rejected."
As postmodernist thinkers, such as Jacques Derrida and Michel 
Foucault, have furthered the structuralist critique of foundationalism, their 
partial successes and ultimate failures again can be retraced in order to avoid 
the postmodern impasse. Foucault furthers his predecessors' criticisms of 
modernism by subjecting structuralism itself to discursive analysis. He 
realizes one's "terms and concepts . .  . are always bound up with the signifying 
processes [they set| out to analyse" (Norris 9). Foucault, therefore, analyzes
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discursive practices as cultural products rather than as the universal system 
imagined by structuralists. If one's discursive practices are historically 
contingent, then individual knowledge is even less of an direct description of 
foundational reality. Despite this provocative revision of structuralism and 
its critique of foundationalism, these two leading postmodernist thinkers 
have not "deve!op[ed their own] principles," as Dewey warns, "positively 
and constructively" enough to avert contemporary composition’s impasse 
over agency.
Jacques Derrida and Absolute Absence
Like Freire's critical literacy, Derrida's deconstructive strategy tries to
make resistance possible against the dominant ideology. The strategy of 
deconstruction begins with the identification of binary oppositions; for 
example, Derrida deconstructs foundationalism by examining "the 
opposition of presence and absence" (Grammatology 143). He refers to 
foundationalism as "the metaphysics of presence" because in this 
epistemology, one's inherent identity or 'self-present-ness' is assumed to be 
demonstrated by one's individual consciousness or 'inner voice.' This initial 
assumption of one's self-presence leads to the parallel assumption of a 
foundational reality when the apparent relationship between identity and 
voice is transferred to that of reality and mind. Just as the individual self is 
assumed to be manifested by consciousness, so too is an absolute reality 
believed to be revealed by ones thoughts (Crowley Teacher’s 2-3).
After identifying this binary opposition between presence and absence, 
Derrida employs the second tactic of deconstruction; he reintroduces the 
marginalized supplement which, in this case, is writing. Within the
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foundational metaphysics of presence, writing is believed to be the mere 
transcription of speech which, in turn, is considered the expression of an 
individual's prior thoughts. Yet Derrida warns, "writing is dangerous from 
the moment that representation there [in writingl claims to be presence and 
the sign of the thing in itself' (Grammatology 144). By "presence," Derrida 
means the self-presentation of the author "there" in the text using words 
conceived of as "sign[s| of the thing in itself" according to a representational 
theory of language. Writing disrupts the untenable hierarchy of presence 
over absence because, Derrida argues, writing functions not through a writer's 
presence but by her or his absence.
As Derrida explains in "Signature Event Context," his concept of 
absence does not just refer to the delayed presence of the reader or the prior 
presence of the author in relation to the text (179). Instead he insists, a text 
communicates when "the mark that [the writerj abandons . . . continues to 
produce effects independently of his presence" (177). Writing functions as the 
writer disappears into language, for writing "is a mark which remains, which 
is not exhausted in the present of its inscription, and which can give rise to an 
iteration both in the absence of and beyond the presence of [the author]" (181). 
In other words, the possible chain of signifiers extends beyond the moment of 
a text's composition. Like de Saussure, Derrida conceives language as a 
differential network of signs in which signifiers only refer to each other. 
Derrida states, "[language is] a system of differences in which each unit is 
constituted in reference to [another signified" ("Discussion" 8). De Saussure s 
differential network of signs becomes Derrida’s "differance" in which he 
puns on the meaning of the French verb "differer" - - to differ' and to defer.’ 
Language functions not only as signs that differ from each other, but also as
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they defer, or delay, any certainty of meaning.
Using the multiple definitions of the word "communication," Derrida 
demonstrates this "difference" to show a word does not possess one "unique, 
univocal, rigorous controllable, and transmittable" meaning ("Signature" 
172). Nor does context completely narrow a word's "polysemic aspects" 
because context itself "is never entirely determinable" since it is inferred from 
the separate, polysemic words that comprise a text (173, 175). With this 
possibility of multiple iterations and endless signification within a non- 
representational theory of language, the foundational metaphysics of 
presence collapses. A text is not a "transitional medium of . . .  a unified 
meaning” based from an author's presence; writing does not simply record 
the oral expression of a writer's prior thoughts (172). Instead, as Paul Smith 
explains, Derrida considers writing to be the textual site where the 
"machinery of language . . . goes on without us . . . any 'I' exists only as a 
passive construct of a system of [linguistic] forces" (48).
Similar to Barthes, Derrida reduces individual writers and readers to 
passive conduits of discourse so he is a much better critic of foundationalism 
than an advocate of non-foundationalism. For he does not offer any account 
of the ability of a subject, situated in discourses, to deliberately create, assert, 
examine, and m aintain/or modify meaning. Derrida himself exposes the 
limits of his anti-foundationalism. In response to criticisms of his 
deconstructive theory, Derrida reverts to such foundational claims of 
authorship as being misinterpreted as though his presence determines 
meaning in order to answer his critics (Dasenbrock 670).
Derrida cannot expalin non-foundational agency because he "take[s his] 
clew" from foundationalism’s asertion of a writer's absolute presence. In
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"Signature Event Context," Derrida negatively deveops his postmodern
theory as he insists on the absolute absence of readers and writers:
all writing m u st. . .  be capable of functioning in the radical absence of 
of every empirically determ ined receiver in general. . . .  What holds for 
the receiver also holds, for the same reasons, for the sender or producer.
To write is to produce a mark . . .  which [a writer's! disappearence will 
not, in principle, hinder in its functioning, offering . . .  itself to be read 
and rewritten. (180)
Yet this insistence that writing functions independently of any and all writers 
and readers precludes individual agency. By taking his clue from 
foundational presence, Derrida conceives of "subjectivity as a mere passivity, 
a simple conductor of semantic forces" (Smith 50). Lacking a tenable concept 
of hum an age, Derrida's deconstructive theory has been analyzed as a 
rigorous critique and an irrational subversion of Western thought by 
Chistopher Norris and Jurgen Habermas respectively. More moderately, 
Richard Rorty deems Derrida to be more of a utopian dreamer than a rational 
philosopher. (For a lively exchange, see Norris' "Deconstruction, 
Postmodernism and Philosophy: Habermas on Derrida" and Rorty's " "Is 
Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?" in Derrida: A Critical Reader).
In his later writings like "Deconstruction and the Other,” Derrida 
claims not to have killed the author/subject as his structuralist predecessor 
Barthes did without remorse. Derrida contends, 'To deconstruct the subject 
does not mean to deny its existence . . . .  [deconstructionI does n o t . . . destroy 
the subject; it simply tries to resituate it" (qtd. by Szkudlarek 56). This 
resituation, however, does destroy the subject as agent because, as Smith 
objects, "Derrida does not provide ant notion of how human agents mediate 
the actual proces [of signification] . . . .  Derrida's promise of resistance cannot 
be fulfilled, simply because he cannot imagine 'who' might effect the
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resistance" (53). By not granting the individual agent even a limited presence, 
Derrida risks the relativism that always threatens anti-foundationalism and 
appears in Faiglev's postm odern networked classroom. Although Derrida 
partially succeeds as a critic of foundationalism, he ultimately fails as an 
advocate of non-foundationalism. This partial success and ultimate failure 
suggest that deconstructive resistance requires some individual presence if an 
adequate account of non-foundational agency is to be achieved. Derrida's 
postmodern colleague Michel Foucault, over the course of his career, also 
struggles to situate the subject within discursive practices without precluding 
individual agency. His greater degree of success suggests that the postmodern 
impasse is not irresolvable.
Michel Foucault and Discursive Oppression
Like Derrida in his later writings, Foucault, in retrospect, states he has 
always been concerned with the subject rather than committed to its 
elimination. He claims, 'T he  goal of my work . . . has not been to analyze the 
phenomena of power . . . .  [but] to create a history of the different modes by 
which, in our culture, hum an beings have been made subjects" ("Subject" 
208). A retracing of Foucault's gradual revision of his concept of subjectivity 
reveals another crucial missed turn along the path towards the postmodern 
impasse.
In his early writings like The Order of Things (1966), Foucault asserts 
the structuralist reversal of language before thought which creates the 
postmodern impasse. He predicts, like Barthes, the autonomous subject "is 
in the process of perishing as the being of language continues to shine ever 
brighter on the horizon" (Order 386). 1 Foucault, however, quickly
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complicates this poststructuralist priority of language and the resulting denial 
of agency. In "What is an Author?" (1969), he distinguishes between a writer 
and an author by comparing their relationship with that of an author and a 
narrator. He states, "It would be just as wrong to equate the author with the 
real writer as to equate him with the fictitious speaker" (270). In contrast to 
the living writer, "the author does not precede the works" but is "only a 
projection . . .  of the operations that we force texts to undergo" (274, 269). 
Formalist critics, for example, analyze authors as well as literary works 
according to their assumed theoretical coherence and stylistic unity. 
Foucault, therefore, demands, "we must entirely reverse the traditional idea 
of the author" by "depriving the subject. . .  of its role as originator" (274). Yet 
as he analyzes "the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse," 
Foucault never again mentions the previously distinguished "real writer" in 
this essay (274).
When Foucault does address the role of "the individual . . . who wrote 
the text” as distinct from the author function, he begins to differ significantly 
from his structuralist predecessors (221). Unlike Barthes, Foucault argues in 
'The Discourse on Language" (1971), "it would be ridiculous to deny the 
existence of individuals who write, and invent" even as he critiques "the 
founding subject [whol permits us to elide the reality of discourse" (222, 227). 2 
Although Foucault, like Derrida, situates the individual writer within 
discourse, he does not insist that language totally predetermines the subject's 
thoughts. As an example of agency, he cites Mendel's ability to disrupt the 
discourse of nineteenth century botany and to advance his genetic theory 
based on his study of the dominant and recessive characteristics of peas. 
Foucault also mentions the complete incomprehension with which other
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nineteenth century botanists responded to M endel's study to demonstrate the 
difficulty as well as the possibility of individual agency (224). As Foucault 
continues his historical study of discursive practices, he concludes that the 
very complexity of m odem  societies' invasive powers requires, rather than 
precludes, individual agency.
Discursive practices, Foucault explains in T he Subject and Power” 
(1982), "in a given society, are multiple; they are superimposed, they cross, 
impose their own limits, sometimes cancel one another out, sometimes 
reinforce one another" (224). These practices are never entirely consistent, 
and they actually depend upon constrained individual agency. In contrast to 
physical violence that "closes the door on all possibilities," Foucault 
conceives of discursive power as "a total structure of actions brought to bear 
upon the possible actions [of the subject)" who reacts according to "a whole 
field of responses" (220). Thus, the power of dom inant discourses "includes 
an important element: freedom. Power is exercised only over free subjects" 
(221). Confronted by the multiple and inconsistent dem ands of the dominant 
ideology, a subject has some autonomy to determine an appropriate response. 
Or as he states in The History of Sexuality, "Discourse transmits and produces 
power, it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile 
and makes it possible to thwart it" (vol. 1 101). This agency with which an 
individual responds to and possibly thwarts discursive power implies a 
positive concept of freedom, meaning the freedom to act. In contrast, a 
negative conception of freedom stresses freedom from external constraints 
(Szkudlarek 42). Yet as Foucault tries to explain an individual's resistance 
within yet against discourse, he implies a negative concept of freedom which 
blocks his own path towards postmodern agency.
39
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In "The Discourse on Language" and "The Subject and Power," 
Foucault "takefs his] clew" from the assumed neutrality of foundational 
language by insisting upon the violence of poststructuralist discourse. In the 
first essay, he tries to expose "the prodigious machinery of the [foundational] 
will to truth" that makes "only one truth appear before our eyes' 
("Discourse” 220). 3 Like Derrida, Foucault opposes a representational theory 
of language and warns, "we should not imagine that the world presents us 
with a legible face, leaving us to to merely decipher i t . . . .  we must conceive 
discourse as a violence that we do to things, or, at all events, as a practice we 
impose on them" (229). This conception of discourse as violence, however, 
results in a negative notion of freedom incompatible with Foucault's anti- 
foundationalism and implies the very foundationalism he opposes. When 
he implies "things" have some prior, and presumably better, existence before 
language is ”impose[d] on them," Foucault reverts to a foundational 
epistemology. Although Foucault later distinguishes discursive power from 
physical violence in "The Subject and Power," he does not avoid the 
incompatibility of a concept of negative freedom and his anti- 
foundationalism .
In contrast to physical violence, Foucault admits, "a society without 
power relations can only be an abstraction" and discursive power does not 
”constitut[e] a fatality at the heart of societies" (’The Subject" 222, 223). Yet he 
persists in describing discursive practices as external impositions or 
constraints that the subject "is placed in" and internalizes, "turnfing] him- or 
herself into a subject" (209, 208). These practices "give the ability to modify, 
use, consume or destroy” and ensure "the maintenance of privileges, the 
accumulation of profits, the bringing into operation of statutory authority, the
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exercise of a function of trade" (217, 223). Foucault concedes that these 
practices are productive, but never that they are very beneficial. Discourse 
does not enable individuals, for example, to achieve greater security within 
their material and social environment, and this persistent rhetoric of
discourse as oppressive, if not violent, unfortunately leads to the postmodern 
paralysis Bizzell observed in Berlin's postmodern course.
Because of this discursive oppression, a Foucauldian subject would 
seek the negative freedom of escape from the dom inant discursive practices 
instead of the positive freedom to act within the complex matrixes of
discourses already acknowledged by this theorist. Yet if a Foucauldian subject 
rejects the dominant discursive practices entirely, then non-foundational 
alternatives can be neither validated, nor disproven. Foundational truth is 
verified by its correspondence to a prior reality, but non-foundational truth is 
validated in relation to other previously yet tentatively accepted beliefs. 
Within this network of contingent assertions, "doubts about our knowledge 
are possible . . . [but notj all at once" (May 98). Unlike an absolute
foundational reality, this prior network is never assumed to be "stable or 
uniform" because "any part of the background may be brought forward for 
questioning in its own turn" (May 96, 99). Yet Foucault's rhetoric of
discursive oppression precludes this methodical consideration of separate 
beliefs because the pursuit of negative freedom deprives an individual of the 
nececessary network of contingent assertions w ithin which to consider the 
validity of a particular belief. Foucauldian subjects do not grasp the 
revolutionary agency of absolute resistance; they instead are seized by 
postmodern paralysis that gripped Berlin's students. An adequate account of 
non-foundational agency m ust recognize that discourse is not neutral
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without insisting on its oppressiveness so that an individual's positive 
freedom to act within the complex matrixes of discourse can be maintained.
Reconstructing a Deweyan Direction Beyond the Impasse
At the end of his career, Foucault finally "weakens his anti-modernist 
edge" by reconsidering poststructuralism's assumed dichotomy between 
society and the individual (Szkudlarek 55). For Barthes and Derrida, this 
dichotomy reduces the individual writer to one who mingles prior cultural 
sources and one whose absence permits endless signification. Yet in The 
Political Technologies of Individuals" published posthumously, Foucault 
addresses the complications of postmodern subjectivity often implicit in his 
earlier writings. Foucault still warns, "individual life is becoming at this 
moment a duty for the state," yet he subtly revises his rhetoric about 
subjectivity (147). He examines the "political technologies which we have 
fo rm ed  in our societies," not the dominant discourses that have formed us 
(162, italics added). Through this subtle revision, Foucault places the 
postmodern subject in a dialectical relationship with society's discursive 
practices which represent his original concerns of power and knowledge. 4 
Within this dialectic, an individual's discursive choices depend upon a 
society's discursive practices, yet a society's discursive practices also are 
dependent upon individual discursive choices. At the end of his career, 
Foucault reconsiders the "poststructuralist tendency to overlook the power of 
individual discursive voices" as the pragmatist literary theorist Louise 
Rosenblatt has objected (Crowley "Derrida" 180). The social and the 
individual, according to Rosenblatt, are "always implicated in [each] other" so 
a critically conscious individual can be more than a discursive object or a
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paralyzed subject ('Transactional" 385).
Within this dialectical relationship with the social, an individual can 
develop agency through an intersubjective process. The theoretical question, 
therefore, should no longer be the postmodern dilemma quoted in chapter 
one: "Can writers control their writing process or are their writing 
processes -- and, indeed, the writers themselves — constructed by their 
cultural settings?" ( Howard 349 italics added). The framing of this question 
itself reveals the "deterministic heritage of structuralism, still visible in 
postmodern thinking" (Szkudlarek 56). It requires an affirmation of either 
the foundational precedence of the individual to society or the postmodern 
priority of society to the individual. In addition to his admonition against 
developing a new philosophy "negatively," Dewey cautions, humanity 
"likes to think in terms of extreme opposites. It is given to formulating its 
beliefs in terms of Either-Ors, between which it recognizes no intermediate 
possibilities" (Experience and Education 17). As he developed his own non- 
foundational, pragmatist philosophy, Dewey did not "tak[e his] clew . . .  from 
that which is be rejected" and create a false dualism  between the individual 
and the social.
This dialectical thinker instead developed pragmatism "positively and 
constructively" with many of the concepts already discussed in the first 
chapter and in this one. With Bakhtin, Dewey shares a dialectical conception 
of society and the individual, but he also recognizes that the discursive forum 
is not completely open which his Russian counterpart overlooked. Like 
Freire, Dewey believes that critical consciousness can be developed, but he 
also does not predetermine Marxist principles to be its fruition as Freire does. 
Like Bauer, Dewey realizes that resistance against the privileged must be
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balanced with identification of the other, and unlike Foucault, this pragmatist 
philosopher advocates anti-foundational resistance without creating an 
epistemological crisis. According to Deweyan pragmatism, an individual can 
achieve agency through a non-foundational process of knowing. As chapter 
three will show, if one attends "to the thematical premises from which 
[Dewey's] more mature reflections procee[d] and the critically radical ends to 
which they [lead]" (Gunn 73), it is possible to avoid the postmodern missteps 
and reconstruct a path beyond the current impasse.
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CHAPTER TWO NOTES
1. One of Barthes' later texts demonstrates the similarity of his structuralist 
theory and Foucault's first writings. Compare this quotation of Foucault and 
Barthes' assertion that language is "the destroyer of all subjects]" in Sade 
Fourier Loyola (qtd. by Burke 14).
2. It is helpful to note that the French title Tordre du discours" has been 
translated as The O rder of Discourse" as well as The Discourse on 
Language" because Bruce Herzberg and Kurt Spellmeyer have used these two 
different translations respectively to refer to this one essay.
3. In "The Discourse on Language," Foucault describes three procedures of 
exclusion by which "the production of discourse is at once controlled, 
selected, organised, and redistributed" (216). These procedures consist of the 
outright prohibition of certain discourses (such as homosexual desire in 
contemporary Western society), the division into binary opposites with the 
rejection of the subordinate (such as sanity and madness), and the will to 
truth with its concomitant opposition to falsehood (216-7). Foucault 
ultimately argues that not only are the first two procedures arbitrary, 
modifiable, and violent, but so is the third (218). Although he qualifies 
"arbitrary” with the stipulation "if not developing out out of historical 
contingency" (218), Foucault never examines its significance and persists in 
this rhetoric of discourse as violence.
4. Foucault offers an inadvertant example of this dialectical relationship in 
'T he  Discourse on Language." In the first sentence, Foucault states his wish 
"to have slipped impereceptibly into this lecture . . . .  to be enveloped by 
words . . . .  to have perceived a nameless voice, long preceding me, leaving 
me to merely enmesh myself in it" (215). Then, he concludes by identifying 
Jean Hyppolite, a deceased intellectual mentor, as the voice he "would have 
wished for, preceding me . . . inviting me to speak and lodging within my 
own speech" (237). Although Foucault wishes his mentor's voice would 
"lodg[e] w ithin [his] own speech," he has done more than "merely enmesh 
[himlself in it." Foucault's voice does not simply mingle quotations of prior 
sources as Barthes contends, nor is its just an absence that permits endless 
signification as Derrida claims.
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CHAPTER ffl
46
THE NON-FOUNDATIONAL ALTERNATIVE OF 
DEWEYAN PRAGMATISM:
"The problems . . .  of [traditional] philosophy are. . .  
blocks to inquiry [and] blind alleys"
"[The concepts] of freedom and of a free human subject. . .  
are hardly present in the discourse of postmodernism, 
apart from appearing as objects of deconstruction."
- - Tomasz Szkudlarek
'The effect of the pragmatist move . . .  is not to disconfirm 
the subject but to reconfirm it." - - Giles Gunn
Like Derrida's deconstruction of absolute presence and Foucault's 
critique of autonomous subjectivity, John Dewey's pragmatic philosophv 
opposes the tenets of foundationalism. Deweyan pragmatism denies the 
foundational beliefs that a knower has direct and unmediated access to a fixed 
and prior reality, this access yields reliable knowledge upon which one acts, 
and this knowledge can be conveyed through neutral, unambiguous 
language. Yet, as Dewey opposes these tenets, he does not "tak[e his] clew" 
from the very foundationalism he seeks to reject. He "surrenders] not 
merely the old solutions, but the old problems" of foundationalism as well 
("Need" 20-1). For Dewey realizes these problems involve irreconcilable 
dichotomies or, what he terms, false dualisms created by flawed "Either/Or
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thinking" (Experience and Education 17). * Instead of offering new 
solutions to these dichotomies, Dewey reconsiders the very premises 
that produce these puzzling obstacles like the postmodern impasse of agency.
To "positively and constructively" develop pragmatic philosophy, 
Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and Dewey reconsidered the 
foundational concepts of knowledge, language, identity, and philosophy. 
Through this reconsideration, these pragmatists created a non-foundational 
alternative that avoids false dualisms entirely. Deweyan pragmatism rightly 
rejects classical and contemporary dichotomies as "blocks to inquiry, blind 
alleys . . . [and irresolvable| puzzles" (EN 9). This epistemological alternative, 
for example, heralds postmodernism's subsequent emphasis on discourse 
without locating the subject in a prisonhouse of language. By examining 
"the ways of experiencing" which include language, Deweyan pragmatism 
denies absolute certainty can ever be claimed yet affirms an individual's 
ability to establish provisional meaning (EM 15). Thus, unlike postmodern 
anti-foundationalism, this non-foundational philosophy provides a tenable 
theory of agency.
False Dualisms and the Pragmatic Reconstruction of Experience
Dewey reconsiders the premises of "old” foundational problems by 
tracing them to their classical origins. The ancient Greeks, he explains in The 
Quest for Certainty, sought absolute truths because they had little control 
over the frustrating vicissitudes of daily life. To feel more secure, the Greeks 
worshipped mythical gods, like Zeus, then more abstract entities, such as the 
Platonic forms. By assuming these ideals existed as an ultimate reality, the
*For brevity o f  citation, the similar titles o f  Experience and E ducation  and 
Experience and  N ature  will be cited as the respective abbreviations: EE and EN.
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Greeks could avoid the frustrations of daily life and seek invariant answers by 
contemplating this realm. If this reality precedes and transcends daily 
appearances and activities, then contemplation of its ideals - - it was hoped 
- - would provide absolute certainty. 1
To assume the existence of this ultimate reality, classical thinkers had 
to confuse the known with the real. The Greeks actually believed in the 
reality of the Platonic forms Truth, Beauty, and Goodness by generalizing 
their knozoledge of particular examples, such as a true statement, a beautiful 
face, and a good deed. Yet the Greeks reversed this reasoning to assume that 
these transitory appearances were produced by the abstract ideals. They 
confused, or better yet - conflated, their knowledge of good deeds with the 
reality of Goodness. Even Aristotle, who rejected Plato's idealism for 
empiricism, inductively developed taxonomies of natural forms, then 
reasoned from his knowledge of these forms as though they were absolutely 
real in order to posit the Prime Mover - God. Dewey identifies this conflation 
of the known and the real as the "philosophic fallacy" (EN 27).
When this fallacy occurs, absolute concepts, such as Truth and Beauty 
or thought and language, are assumed to exist. Convinced of the reality of 
these abstract entities, the Greeks believed they could reason from their 
knowledge of them in order to be more certain about transitory appearances, 
such as of the true and the beautiful. Yet once absolute aspects of a 
foundational reality are believed to be known, the epistemological problem 
then becomes to reconcile the false dualisms between them and create a 
coherent philosophy. The Greeks' foundational reality has been reconceived 
several times, but the problem of reconciling false dualisms persists. 
Medieval Christians, such as Augustine and Aquinas, replaced the classical 
ideals with an eternal divinity, and Enlightenment Age empiricists, like
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Galileo and Newton, substituted mathematical quantities for divine traits. Yet 
when empirical scientists, for example, conflated the mathematically known
- - the quantitative - - with the real, they stripped science of any concern with 
the imediately experienced - - the qualitative. These scientists erected "a hard 
and fast wall" between the individual who experiences the qualitative, the 
world of shapes and colors, and a foundationalist reality of quantifiable 
objects and concepts (EN  48). This false dualism  between subjective 
experience and and objective reality locates all qualitative aspects of 
experience in the individual. Mind is separted from matter; practice is 
divorced from theory, and philosophers from Spinoza to Kant have struggled
- - in vain - - to put them back together again.
By examining the influence of language upon thought, postmodernists 
like Foucault and Derrida have deconstructed the false dualism  between the 
mind of an  individual knower and the matter of a foundational reality. Yet 
as they redress the foundational neglect of language's influence upon 
knowledge, postmodernists also risk creating another false dualism through 
the philosophic fallacy. Like the foundationalists they oppose, postmodernists 
analyze one aspect of experience -- in this case, language — as though it 
precedes all others. These anti-foundationalists reject one false dualism only 
to suggest another in which discursive practices are assumed to dominate the 
subject. Unfortunately, they cannot reconcile discourse and subjectivity 
because they too reason from their knowledge of language as though it were 
absolutely real.
Unlike foundationalism which misconceives knowledge and the anti- 
foundationalism which misconstrues the influence of language, Deweyan 
pragmatism begins with experience "as the starting point of philosophic 
thought" (EN 10). Dewey defines experience as an individual's interactions,
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or better yet - transactions, with the material and social environment. Late in 
his career, he substituted the term transaction' for his previous use of the 
word interaction’ in order to emphasize that the individual and the 
environment are mutually affected by each other. These transactional 
experiences, Dewey insists, are "had" initially, meaning they first are 
undergone rather than known. Unlike idealistic and realistic foundational 
thinkers such as Plato and Locke, Dewey does not dismiss experiences as 
mere appearances, nor does he mistake these transactions for immediate 
knowledge. He distinguishes experience from knowledge by asserting the 
primacy of experience.
From this philosophic starting point, Dewey reconceives knowledge 
and language without creating a false dualism between them. He instead 
conceives of experience, knowledge, and language as dynamically interrelated 
concepts; one is not granted a paramount reality that is then used to 
determine the other two. Dewey opposes foundational knowledge without 
reaching the postmodern impasse because he considers the influence of an 
individual’s experience and knowledge on language as well as language's 
influence on an individual’s experience and knowledge. Dewey's 
reconception of these fundam ental premises represents his philosophical 
brilliance and his dazzling difficulty of his thought for others. 2 Dewey’s 
concept of experience, for example, cannot be comprehended fully until his 
concept of language is also understood. Yet if one attends to the reconstructed 
premises of Dewey’s mature thought, the false dualisms of foundationalism 
and anti-foundationalism are no longer irreconcilable, but irrelevant.
Experience and the Pragmatic Reconstruction of Knowledge
According to William James' famous phrase, experience is a
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continuous "stream of consciousness," a ceaseless flux of mental and physical 
transactions (Principles, vol. I, 238). As an individual undergoes these 
experiences, these transactions do not have to be enjoyed or endured 
passively. To repeat an enjoyment, to end some suffering, or to satisfy one's 
curiosity, an individual can develop knowledge from this experiential 
stream by becoming an active participant in a constructive process of inquiry. 
This deliberate method begins when an individual tries to resolve the "felt 
difficulty" of a physical need, an emotional desire, or intellectual curiosity 
(Haw 107). From the creative tension of a felt difficulty, an active knower 
can engage in exploratory activity to define the problem. The problem is 
defined by relating some, apparently significant qualities from the stream of 
experience. As the problem is defined, a knower tries to form a hypothesis 
which can be tested through deliberate experimentation. Through such 
testing, knowledge not only develops from experience, but also returns to 
experience for verification. The actual practice of this constructive process of 
knowing, of course, is never as orderly as this neat description of its 
components: felt difficulty, problem definition, hypothesis formation,
deliberate experimentation, and provisional verification.
The primacy of experience does not mean that all experiences are 
relative and equal because the development of knowledge enables an 
individual to distinguish "educative" experiences from "mis-educative" one. 
For an experience to be "educative" according to Dewey, it must fulfill two 
criteria: "continuity" and "interaction" (££ 37). First, an experience must
have "continuity" with both past and future experiences so the anticipations 
and expectations that constitute knowledge can be formed and tested. Second, 
"interaction" between the internal and external factors of learning must be 
balanced. For example, a Deweyan educator can use a student's admitted
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aversion to writing formal literary analyses by asking him to write an 
informal journal entry specifically addressed to a classmate. The internal 
factor of a student's dislike for formal criticism, based on negative 
experiences in the past, cannot be changed instantly. The eternal factor of the 
learning environment, however, can be modified. The journal entry 
hopefully extends the student's past preference for informal writing. This text 
then can be treated as a useful gathering of critical insights from which the 
conventions of their more formal presentation, such as the difficult issue of 
audience, can be developed.
Once this academic discourse has been composed, its differences and 
sim ilarities with the original journal entry as well as with published literary 
criticism can be examined to establish continuity with subsequent efforts to 
write formal analyses. By fulfilling the twin criteria of continuity and 
interaction, Dewey's ultimate educational goal of growth can be achieved, and 
this growth is the "reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds 
to the meaning of experience . . . [and| increases the ability to direct . . . 
subsequent experience" (Democracy 89-90).
If an experience fails to fulfill the twin criteria of continuity and 
interaction, Dewey distinguishes this event as "mis-educative" because this 
experience permits a learner to continue a routine response without 
reflecting upon its efficacy (EE 37). In contrast, an educative experience 
requires a learner to act deliberately and to undergo consciously the 
consequences of an action so that continuity with the past and the future can 
be created. During educative experiences, thoughtful reception alternates 
constantly and cumulatively with creative activity so Deweyan pragmatism 
does not just reverse the foundational subordination of activity to thought. 
It instead maintains "that action should be intelligent and reflective, that
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thought should occupy a central position in life" ("Development" 19). Thus, 
pragmatism "is far from the [American! glorification of action for its own 
sake" as some of Dewey's critics have claimed; it is a non-foundational 
philosophy seeking the individual's grow th of intelligent activity 
("Development" 5).
Through this educative dialectic of thought and action, a knower can 
achieve unexpected results so a knower should "leave the outcome to the 
adequacy of the means . . . instead of insisting upon . . .  a conclusion in 
advance" (Art  138-9). As knowledge is constructed from continuous 
experiences, a knower depends upon prior beliefs, but the results of this 
process cannot be predetermined. Dewey's constructive process of knowing 
may be better termed a reconstructive process for two reasons; new 
knowledge is built using past beliefs, and it may rebuild the significance of 
some of those previous beliefs.
When an individual constructs a new assertion through this process, 
this idea can alter the contextual background upon which which a knower 
considers both prior and subsequent knowledge. This alteration can be so 
subtle so as to appear to be a simple addition or so extreme to cause a 
Kuhnian paradigm shift. An extreme contextual alteration, such as from 
geocentrism to heliocentrism, epitomizes what Dewey terms the "real though 
limited" constructive function, or reconstructive effect of knowledge 
("Development" 13). A new belief like Galileo's assertion that the sun, and 
not the earth, is the center of the cosmos constructs a substantially different 
context for experience. The reconstructive effect is real because new 
knowledge can yield future experiences "which could not have been 
produced otherwise" ("Development" 13). Yet the reconstructive effect is 
limited because a new belief cannot alter what is experienced completely and
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permanently. Although Dewey refutes all claims of foundational knowledge, 
he does not deny the existence of an environment with which we interact 
experientially. There is something out there', but by distinguishing 
experience from knowledge, he insists no direct knowledge of the inferred 
reality is possible. A pragmatist knower can use past experiences to anticipate 
the future, but he can never claim to have revealed the real. By conceiving of 
knowledge as an anticipation of the future rather than a revelation of the 
real, Dewey avoids committing the philosophic fallacy.
Because Dewey acknowledges the "suffusive presence" of "past 
affairs" as knowledge is developed, he conceives of freedom positively (EN  
249). He considers freedom to be the "power to act" instead of a negative 
freedom from external constraints (How 87). The negative concept of 
freedom requires an emancipation from one's background of prior beliefs 
which is impossible. According to Deweyan pragmatism, this dynamic 
network of accepted beliefs is alterable but inescapable; the possibility of an 
emancipating "direct appeal to nature" is only a "fiction . . . .  [because| We 
bring to the simplest observation a complex apparatus . . .  of accepted 
meanings and techniques" (EN  180). By conceiving of freedom positively, 
Dewey avoids the epistemological crisis wrought by Foucault's 
poststructualist critique and demonstrated by Berlin's postmodern course.
Among the postmodern anti-foundationalists favored by 
contemporary composition theorists, Freire comes closest to these pragmatist 
conceptions of experience, knowledge, and freedom. Like Dewey, he exposes 
reified knowledge by including the knower, even a marginalized one, in the 
process of knowing. Yet Freire prematurely limits the constructive process of 
knowing by predetermining its eventual outcome to be an undistorted reality 
revealed by Marxism. Even more than Freire, Dewey acknowledges, "the
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ways in which we believe and expect have a tremendous effect upon what 
we believe and expect" because he does not circumscribe this process by 
predetermining its results (EN 15, italics original). The pragmatist's 
development of knowledge always retains a modest awareness of its 
tentativeness, its fallibility. Peirce cautions, we know "the very best of (our 
knowledge! . . .  in only an uncertain and inexact way" (Collected Papers 
5.587). Dewey likewise warns, the experimental method of inquiry can 
validate beliefs so they "may have a practical or moral certainty," but 
knowledge "never lose[sj a hypothetical] quality" (EN  129). Future
verification can only be assumed, not assured. Deweyan pragmatism offers 
neither the comfort of foundationalism's absolute certainty, nor the distress 
of postmodernism's paralyzing skepticism.
Experience, Knowledge, and the Pragmatic Reconstruction of Language
As Dewey creates a non-foundational theory of an individual's
development of knowledge from experience, he also reconceives the role 
language plays in this process. He rejects the foundational concept of 
language because this representational theory overlooks language's influence 
upon knowledge and even experience. According to foundationalism, 
knowledge reveals the real, an antecedent and absolute reality, and this 
knowledge then is communicated through language. Words name or re­
present the reality known. It is this priority of knowledge to language that
Dewey opposes and whose origins he explains.
Words, according to Dewey, "register [an experiential] relationship and 
makes it fruitful in other contexts of particular experience" rather than name 
the real (EN 155). He uses the example of the word "fire" to explain that 
language enables a knower to anticipate the possible conditions and
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consequences of this flaming event. This word conveys our expectations that 
"fire" can warm, cook, or bum  depending on its conditions (EN  154). 
Language converts previously experienced events into considered meanings 
for the future. As these expectations are confirmed by other, later experiences, 
it is easy to imagine that "things, meanings, and words correspond" Dewey 
cautions (EN 142). Yet this assumption leads to the philosophic fallacy in 
which knowledge of eventual outcomes is conflated with a reality of 
antecedent objects Once this prior reality is assumed to exist, then thought 
can be misconceived by foundationalists as "complete prior to language. 
Language thus 'expressses' thought as a pipe conducts water" (EN 141). 
These flawed foundational assumptions reduce language to a hollow 
medium that carries individual thought - - a conception that Dewey does not 
accept.
As Dewey reconstructs the foundational concept of language, he does 
not oppose the false dualism between language and knowledge only to create 
another between discursive practices and the individual knower. Dewey 
neither overlooks, nor overstates language's influence; he and his fellow 
pragmatists acknowledge the influence language has upon our knowledge of 
experience. Some beliefs, James explains, have been "built into the very 
structure of language" because "these extraordinarily successful hypotheses . .
. straighte[n| the discontinuities of . . . immediate experiences" ("Pragmatism" 
85). These built-in beliefs constitute the background of prior beliefs upon 
which subsequent experiences and developments of knowledge occur. Or as 
Dewey asserts, "experience is already overlaid and saturated w ith the products 
o f . . .  past generations . . . .  It is filled with interpretations [and] classifications 
. . . which have been incorporated into what seems to be fresh [thought!" (EN 
34). Language is not a neutral medium of sef-expression; it is a discursive
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system of "interpretations [andl classifications" created by "past generations."
Similar to Bahktin, Dewey believes an individual's 'own' thoughts 
develop through the collaborative relationships created by language. As a 
child acquires language, Dewey states,
The conceptions that are socially current and important become the 
child's principles of interpretation and estimation long before he . . . 
[seeks] personal and deliberate control of conduct. Things come to him 
clothed in language, not in physical nakedness, and this garb of 
communication makes him a sharer in the beliefs of those around him.
CReconstruction 92)
Even as an adult, an individual is influenced by this discursive 
intersubjectivity, this implicit collaboration w ith others.
In Art as Experience, Dewey uses the example of an artist to illustrate 
this collaboration. Every creative process involves both productive activity 
and evaluative reception. Before the next brushstroke or line can be added, 
an artist must undergo, meaning to experience, the consequences of the 
developing work. These evaluative pauses are often so short and 
subconscious that many creators deny having any audience awareness at all. 
Yet as they undergo their works in progress, these artists ”becom[e| the 
receiving audience" by drawing upon the concepts and the criteria built into 
their creative medium, be they painter or poet (A rt  106). Even the most 
avant garde artist depends on her audience's conventional expectations even 
as she tries to disrupt and redefine them. In all communication, one 
individual creates meaning through the common terms of a discourse and 
tries to conceive the meaning "as it functions in [another's] experience" (EN 
148).
Because we acquire an influentialu>ay of experiencing from others 
through language, Dewey states, no individual can ever "withdra[w| into a
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wholly private realm" (EN 141). Or as Peirce states, "a person is not absolutely 
an individual" because all thought involves the collaborative enterprise of 
language (Collected Papers 5.421). Even when a writer seeks the physical 
isolation often associated with composing, this individual is involved in this 
discursive intersubjectivity. Like Dale Bauer and Kenneth Burke, Dewey 
considers communication to be a discursive collaboration with the other.
W ithout such identification w ith the other, Dewey's goal of 
"intellectual and moral growth" cannot be realized 0Democracy 362). Instead 
of seeking wider democratic associations, a group may curtail "full interaction 
with other groups" in order to protect "what its has" (Democracy 99). 
Language can aid such premature closure as much as it can foster 
reconstructive collaboration. Like Foucault, Dewey acknowledges the power 
relations implicit within discourse because language "condenses meanings 
that record social outcomes and presage social outlooks" (Democracy 46). 3 
Yet this condensation of meaning is not so thick as to be impenetrable. By 
the pragmatist acknowledgment of "the extent to which [the) ways [of 
believing] are unwittingly fixed by social custom and tradition," a member of 
a society can seek the deliberate coordination of these discursive and 
conceptual influences if a positive concept of freedom is sought (E N  34). 
Then an individual can pursue the power to act, meaning agency, through 
the reconstruction of accepted beliefs using what Dewey terms "the tool of 
tools . . . the cherishing mother of significance" - - language (EN  154).
Agency and the Pragmatic Reconstruction of Philosophy
As he acknowledges language's significant influence on experience and 
knowledge, Dewey does not assume the individual is dom inated by 
discursive practices. He does not analyze language as an fixed cultural reality
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then inhabit this theoretical structure with subjects who m ust be considered 
"an effect rather than a cause of discourse" as Faigley does (Fragments 9). 
Dewey instead believes individuals can critically examine language's 
influential ways because he locates individuals and language in a 
transactional relationship. He readily acknowledges the influence of language 
when he asserts, "experience is dependent upon an extension of language" 
(EN  143). Yet Dewey conceives of language with the same complexity with 
which he considers experience. After asserting the dependence of experience 
upon language, he immediately stipulates in his next phrase, "[language| 
which is a social product and operation" (EN  143, italics added). By 
considering discourse as a social product and  operation — or process, Dewey 
is able to offer a tenable theory of non-foundational agency.
Language must be conceived as a process as well as a product because, 
like society for Dewey, it "not only continues to exist by transmission, by 
communication, it may be fairly said to exist in transmission, in 
communication" (Democracy 5). As a social product, language only exists in 
the process of its transmission between individual members of a society. 
When postmodernists analyze language as an influential product, they ignore 
the process by which it exists. Although they "point out that the self . . .  is 
socially constructed," postmodernists "neglect to point out that the social . . . 
is itself previously . . . constructed" by its individual members (Vitanza 157). 
During their continuation of language, individuals can reflexively reconsider 
its influence. Within a society, they can achieve the positive freedom to act, 
meaning agency, through the reconstruction of accepted beliefs and ways of 
believing. This reconstruction is possible because experience and knowledge 
influence language as much as language influences them.
As each person acquires language, they form a "personal linquistic-
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experiential reservoir" according to the pragmatist literary theorist Louise 
Rosenblatt ('Transactional" 381). Through this personal internalization of 
language, individuals can create variations of meanings for a specific term, 
such as subjectivity. Postmodernists, for example, have varied the 
foundational meaning of subjectivity, a personal viewpoint upon an 
experience, by denying that an individual has any personal control over one s 
perspective. In addition to such variations of meaning, postmodernists also 
have substituted one term for another. They have replaced the foundational 
term "individual" with "subject" to indicate their opposition to any concept 
of autonomous agency (Berlin "Poststructuralism" 18). As demonstrated by 
the postmodernists’ own use of varied meanings and multiple terms, the 
dominant discourse is never so stable and uniform so as render the 
individual a subject completely subordinate to discursive practices. The 
instability and heteroglossia of language create the discursive space for 
individual agency.
Through language, Dewey asserts, all "events are subject to 
reconsideration and revision" because "their meanings may be infinitely 
combined and re-arranged in [the] imagination" of individuals (EN 138). 
These imaginative recombinations can lead to the reconstruction of prior 
beliefs because the differences between these alternatives can be considered 
and verified. In contrast to foundationalists, Dewey does not conceive of 
verification as correspondence to "a world [assumed to be] already 
constructed and determined" ("Development" 13). He instead develops 
Peirce's theory of meaning in which meaning is determined by the effect a 
belief has on one’s actions: "the purport of any concept is its conceived 
bearing upon our conduct" (Collected Papers 5.460). For James and Dewey, 
knowledge becomes true when a belief permits an individual to achieve a
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desired outcome. Yet verification is not just a matter of 'w hat works' 
immediately, for it involves the continued success of a belief in relation to 
other accepted assertions. The common connotation of "pragmatic" as 
'crassly expedient' is far different from the philosophical denotations of 
"pragmatist" and "pragmatism" for Peirce, James, and Dewey. 4
The pragmatist's standard of verification also differs significantly from 
the postmodern criterion of coherence within an solipsistic system of 
language. For de Saussure and Derrida, an assertion can never be verified 
beyond its statement in a particular discourse because they conceive of 
language as a differential network of signifiers. Or as Derrida explains, 
"[language is] a system of differences in which each unit is constituted in 
reference to [another signifier)" ("Discussion" 8). Since these signifiers refer 
only to each other -- and not to a prior reality or to an anticipated outcome -  
postmodern verification depends entirely on discursive coherence.
Based on the pragmatist theory of verification, knowledge never 
attains absolute certainty, and language never becomes a postmodern 
prisonhouse. The contingency of belief means that the known cannot be 
conflated with the real, but the consequences of one assertion can be
compared with another. In Experience and Nature, Dewey likens this
critical inquiry to
intellectual disrobing. We cannot permanently divest ourselves of
the intellectual habits we take on and wear when we assimilate the
culture of our own time and place. But intellectual furthering of culture 
demands that we take them off, that we inspect them critically to see 
what they are made of and what wearing them does to us. (35)
Our entire contextual background of beliefs cannot be cast off all at once, but 
separate beliefs may be foregrounded for examination.
Through the process of intellectual disrobing, we can never remove all
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of the cultural garments we wear at once in order to reveal an "original, 
eternal, and absolute" innocence or identity (£iV 185). But we also do not 
have to be the passive occupants of postmodern subject positions. This 
examination of one's cultural habits instead suggests the self is, and can be 
deliberately, constructed as a "historic, intermediate, temporally relative, and 
instrum ental" subjectivity (EN 185). Dewey's assertion of this alternative 
theory of a self "in continuous formation through choice of action" 
exemplifies this critical comparison of specific beliefs (Democracy 408). Upon 
the background of his non-foundational concepts of experience, knowledge, 
and language, he has weighed the consequences of asserting a theory of an 
antecedent and absolute self or of a fluid and dynamic identity. The 
foundational concept of a complete self reduces expression to an impulsive 
"spewing forth," but the non-foundational concept means expression is "to 
carry forward in development" (Art  62). The crucial difference is that the 
former emphasizes the pressing out of a product from within and the latter 
balances the creative self with the external conditions. In this transactional 
relationship between creator and conditions, the process or "methods . . . fare 
placed) upon the [same) level of importance as has, in the past, been imputed 
exclusively to ends" or the product (Quest 279).
The critical process of comparing contingent beliefs is not limited to 
only extant knowledge; an individual can create previously unimagined 
alternatives. Dewey, for example, practices the dialectical method of his early 
Hegelian training when he considers the foundational conundrum of 
objectivity and subjectivity. Dewey examines the contradiction, or false 
dualism, created by foundationalism between objectivity and subjectivity. He 
rejects the thesis of complete objectivity by acknowledging the knower's 
influence upon the known. He also opposes the antithesis of total subjectivity
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by affirming the discursive collaborations between individuals. He then 
creates a synthesis according to which knowledge is objective and subjective 
based on his reconception of those terms. As a culturally constructed product, 
knowledge is 'objective' as a "standardized habit . . .  of social interaction" 
(EN 157). Yet as an individually influenced process, knowledge is also 
'subjective' because "every new idea . . . must have its origin in an 
individual” who reconstructs prior beliefs (Democracy 346).
As Dewey theorizes the reconstruction of beliefs through individual 
activity, he does not overlook the myriad obstacles to individual agency 
{Democracy 408). In Democracy and Education, he acknowledges, first, the 
capacity for intelligence often is not realized because the vicissitudes of 
material comfort make most people unwilling to tolerate intellectual 
uncertainty as well. Because "thinking is unsettling," many people will accept 
dogmatism and dependence in order to avoid doubt when threatened by by 
physical distress as well (380). Second, schools foster this preference for 
passivity through their foundationalist "principles of authority and 
acquisition rather than . . . discovery and invention" (327-8). Educational 
reform requires such great philosophical and economic changes that 
education based not on "telling and being told, but an active and constructive 
process, is a principle almost as generally violated in practice as [it is] conceded 
in theory" (46)!
After realizing schools alone cannot foster individual agency as he 
initially had hoped, Dewey acknowledges the need for simultaneous social as 
well as educational reform. The moral theologian Reinhold Niebuhr 
criticizes Dewey's meliorist theory of social reform by questioning whether 
gradual, harmonious change is possible. Given the privileged class' desire for 
self-preservation, Niebuhr objects: "Failure to recognize the stubborn
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resistance of group egoism to all moral and inclusive scial objectives 
inevitably involves them [liberals like Dewey] in unrealistic and confused 
thought7' (qtd. by West 154). Dewey, however, does realize the problem of 
selfish preservation of social privilege. He considers schools to be political 
institutions that are slow to change because of the "opposition of those who . . 
. realize that [reform] . . . would threaten their ability to use others for their 
own ends" (Democracy 373). A better criticism of Dewey is that he only 
partially recognizes the need for disruptive demonstrations to force the 
privileged to confront a conflict in their values. He acknowledges the 
necessity of "public agitation [and] propaganda” as well as "legislative and 
adminstrative action" to achieve social reform (Democracy 383). Dewey is 
the first author of a philosophy textbook to use a labor strike as an example of 
an ethical dilemma. Yet as a young professor in Chicago, he did not publicly 
support the Pullman strike though he later granted his considerable stature to 
the Trotsky Commission and many other political causes (West brook 86-92, 
480-2). Although it is important to question Dewey's own political 
involvement, this criticism, I fear, asks too much from one man and 
diminishes his considerable accomplishments.
The contemporary neo-pragmatist Cornel West, for example, 
diminishes Dewey's philosophical achievements when he faults him for 
failing "to articulate a plan of social reform" (85). For Dewey does offer some 
specific suggestions for social reform, and West's own prophetic pragmatism 
provides even fewer details (see West 235-9). West also slights his 
predecessor's considerable accomplishments when he claims Dewey seeks 
both an evasion of, and an emancipation from, the epistemological prob'ems 
of m odem  philosophy because the first, negative word -- evasion -  
dominates his text and even his title - The American Evasion of Philosophy
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(87). According to West, Dewey attempts "intellectual regicide" as well as a 
positive redirection of contemporary thought (89). Yet West is himself guilty 
of evading Dewey's revolutionary rejection of not just the "old solutions" but 
the "old problems" as well. Dewey's reconstruction of philosophy precludes, 
rather than evades, epistemological conundrums like the postmodern 
impasse over agency.
Dewey reconceives the problematic premises of foundationalism that 
have created the false dualisms of classical and contemporary thought. He 
proffers alternative concepts of experience, knowledge, language, and self 
which eliminate the persistent puzzles of foundational epistemologies. Yet 
there still remains "a sufficiently large task" for Dewey's reconstruction of 
philosophy' itself ("Need" 69). Instead of being the classical contemplation 
or the modem reconciliation of absolutes, philosophy, for Dewey, becomes 
the pragmatist study of "what the known demands of us" or, in contemporary 
terms, this consideration "of what is possible" is known as cultural criticism 
(Democracy 381). This reconstruction of philosophy eliminates false 
dualism between theory and practice. For Dewey, "the only distinction worth 
drawing is not between practice and theory but between those modes of 
practice that [are and[ are not intelligent" (E/V 290). The sufficient task of 
philosophy is the study of cultural practices that should be repeated because 
they are effective. Dewey does not — and given his assertion of knowledge's 
reconstructive effect, cannot — provide any final blueprint of social reform; he 
instead offers a comprehensive account of the process by which we can 
reform society deliberately. 5 He offers a non-foundational philosophy with 
which we can leam to create, critique and assert beliefs so we can "think of 
[our|selves as agents, not as ends" (Quest 276).
Dewey asserts the primacy of experience as his philosophic starting
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point from which knowledge can be constructed, and he acknowledges 
language's influence upon this constructive process and even experiencing 
itself. As validated beliefs are built into discourses, they can influence 
subsequent experiences and our beliefs about previous ones. Once these 
influential ways of believing are acknowledged, a particular one can be 
examined within the context of other related, tentatively accepted 
assertions. Depending on its consequences, a belief can be maintained, 
modified, or replaced as an individual tries to fulfill Dewey's goal of 
growth -  the continuous reconstruction of experience to increase its present 
meaning and to improve the anticipation of future events. By theorizing an 
individual's ability to influence as well as be influenced by accepted ways of 
believing, Dewey explains the process of non-foundational agency.
It may not be easy to hear the resounding relevance of the tacit 
tradition of pragmatism within composition studies because Dewey offers 
only a few, direct references to writing. Yet these few references should make 
us lean forward and listen very carefully because they whisper the 
significance of pragmatic philosophy for contemporary composition; for 
example.
Even a composition conceived in the head and, therefore, physically 
private, is public in its significant content, since it is conceived with 
reference to execution in a product that is perceptible and hence 
belongs to the common world. (Art  51)
This collaborative concept of composing in which neither the individual 
writer, nor the discursive system predominant is one point where Deweyan 
pragmatism, writing process theories, and postmodernist composition studies 
intersect, a point of intersection which is central to the issue of agency. To 
arrive at this intersection, however, process-oriented and postmodern
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theories have to be read from an unconventional, almost non-Euclidean 
perspective. James Berlin and other postmodern critics resemble Euclid by 
their contention that the parallel lines of writing process and postmodern 
theories never m et Berlin, for example, argues that process-oriented and 
postmodern composition are mutually exclusive because of their 
incompatible epistemological assumptions about a writer, audience, reality, 
and language. Yet Deweyan pragmatism offers an alternative analysis in 
which writing process and postmodern approaches do intersect, and through 
this point of intersection, a new line can be draw n to redirect contemporary 
composition beyond its current impasse. This redirection, however, cannot 
occur until the intersection of Deweyan pragmatism and writing process 
theories is located and mapped.
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CHAPTER THREE NOTES
1. This privileging of contemplation over activity had prior cultural and 
economic sources in the negative associations made towards physical labor. 
Classical philosophers, however, provided the "intellectual formulation and 
justification" for privileged Greeks to perpetuate this divisive epistemology 
(Quest 30).
2. Later realists, like Newton, treated experience as the quantifiable source of 
scientific problems, yet, like Locke, they failed to active the active role of the 
mind in inquiry. Newton, for example, declared, " I do not invent 
hypotheses" and therefore ignored the influence of the knower on the 
known (qtd. in Quest 115). Yet as Dewey quips, "The history of the theory of 
knowledge would have been very different if instead of the word 'data' or 
'givens,' it had happened to start with calling the qualities in question 'takens' 
" (Quest 176).
3. Dewey repeats this non-foundational conception language when he states, 
"[the] qualities we attribute to objects ought to be imputed to our ways of 
experiencing them, and these in turn are due to the force of intercourse and 
custom" (EN 34). As suggested by the final clause of this quotation, he also 
appreciates the possibly, but not necessarily, insidious effect of discourse: 
"[Language hasl unrivaled significance a a means of social direction" 
{Democracy 39).
4. Peirce and Dewey were very ambivalent about the term "pragmatism." As 
this term, in the words of Peirce, "was abused in the merciless way" of 
literary journals, he relinguished it in favor of "pragmatirism" - - a term he 
deemed "ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers" {Collected Papers 5.414). 
To develop a comprehensive, non-foundational philosophy, Dewey struggled 
even more to establish alternative meanings for fundamental philosophical 
terms like 'experience/ In Experience and Nature (revised edition-1929), 
Dewey explicitly names his theory "empirical naturalism or naturalistic 
empiricism," and he almost never mentions "pragmatism" (1). When he 
does, Dewey, like Peirce, abandons this term to the negative connotations of 
others: "capricious pragmatism based on exaltation of personal desire" (198). 
Despite these difficulties, I have decided to use "pragmatism" because its 
positive, non-foundational denotation is being recognized recently, and I find 
the aforementioned alternatives too awkward and unappealing -- just as 
Peirce wished.
5. Dewey's collected works reveal many more specifics on social reform than 
Niebuhr or Cornel West admit. For example, see "Unsettled Problems in the 
Economic Order," "Unsettled Problems in the Economic O rder Continued,"
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and the specific applications of Dewey's thought suggested by Prof. Seager, a 
colleague at Columbia. These proposals include raising the standard of living 
and enacting worker safety and child labor laws (Middle Works , vol. 5, see 
468-509). Or see Dewey's article entitled "Federal Aid for Elementary 
Education" (Middle Works , vol. 10, 121-29). Cornel West faults Dewey for 
failing "to articulate a plan for social reform" yet his own prophetic 
pragmatism is, at least, as vague (American  85 and see 235-9). Like Giles 
Cunn, I consider Dewey's pragmatic philosophy to be an initial, admittedly 
broad, reconstruction of democratic culture. This reconstruction transforms 
the traditional concept of democracy into a moral, economic, and educational 
ideal as well as a political one (75). To demand that Dewey provides a detailed 
as well as a comprehensive blueprint for this democratic culture ignores both 
pragm atism 's commitment to only contingent answers.
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CHAPTER IV
70
FROM "EXPRESSIVISM" TO NON-FOUNDATIONALISM: 
THE INTERSECTION OF WRITING PROCESS THEORIES 
AND DEWEYAN PRAGMATISM
It's not a question of throwing out the innovations of teachers like 
Elbow and M urray . . .  it's a question of relocating those 
practices and interests in a different theoretical context.
— Susan Jarratt
If the se lf . . .  does not exist as [anj agent, the process 
approach to teaching writing would seem to 
be a sham — Robert Yagelski
When Janet Emig identifies pragmatism as one of the tacit traditions 
within contemporary composition, she offers only the one sentence 
statement: "John Dewey is everywhere in our work" ('Tacit" 150). She does 
not elaborate to support this assertion, but she does make a valuable 
suggestion. She suggests the exemplary model of pragmatist theory and 
practice created by "our greatest ally in literature research, Louise Rosenblatt" 
(T acit" 150). Before I articulate the intersection of Deweyan pragmatism and 
writing process theories, I want to follow Emig's suggested direction; I want to 
venture from writing process theories to Rosenblatt's pragmatist literary 
theory to explain the beneficial consequences of putting Dewey's general 
principles into practice. 1 hope this foray into a somewhat foreign field will 
create a new perspective on the too familiar terrain of contemporary 
composition. This new perspective is needed because we are are in danger of 
losing sight of the best practices of Murray's and Elbow's pedagogies. Too
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many composition teachers have become so familiar with the current 
categories of composition that complex and effective writing process 
practices have been reduced to and dismissed as "merely expressive" (Murray 
" B u r  2 ) . 1
After visiting Rosenblatt's pragmatist model in the allied area of 
literature, I expect to return to the writing process theories of Donald Murray 
and Peter Elbow. Then, as with other homecomings, I hope we will see them 
differently. Discerning the pragmatist principles already at work in writing 
process practices will relocate Murray's and Elbow's theories from their 
presumed 'expressivism' to their actual non-foundational pragmatism. 
When viewed within this pragmatist context, Murray's and Elbow's 
pedagogies be explained and extended.
Rosenblatt's Pragmatist Model of Literary Interpretation
Although Rosenblatt began developing her literary theory 
independently of Dewey, she has acknowledged her debt to his pragmatist 
philosophy. 2  Her theory of interpretation and its instruction implements 
Dewey's more general concept of experience, for she reconceives reading as "a 
transaction between the reader and the text" (Literature 35, italics original). 
Like Dewey denying foundational absolutes, Rosenblatt rejects the New 
Critical notion that a reader interprets a literary text by perceiving a fixed 
object. She distinguishes the printed page that physically exists in space from 
the literary work that is a particular "event in time" (Reader 12). The title of 
her 1978 book -- The Reader, The Text, and the Poem — makes manifest the 
importance of this distinction: it is the reader's experience with the text that 
creates the literary work or "poem." A text is only paper and ink "until the 
reader transforms them into a set of meaningful symbols" (Literature 25).
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We must conceive "literature as exploration" — to borrow another title — as 
Rosenblatt asserts in her major work. 3
This pragmatist theory of interpretation and its instruction fulfills the 
Deweyan principles of the primacy of experience, the constructive process of 
knowing, the influence of language upon thought, and the achievement of 
non-foundational agency. Rosenblatt believes literary interpretation and its 
instruction must begin with the reader's experience. She quotes the 
nineteenth century literary theorist Walter Pater who urges "to know one's 
own impression as it really is, to discriminate it, to realise it distinctly is the 
first step" (Reader 131). This first step begins the process through which a 
reader creates a literary work from the printed page. During this first step, a 
reader constructs "hypothetical frameworks, entertains speculations . . . [and 
discriminates between] alternative responses" (Reader 137). These activities 
usually are completed rapidly and unconsciously so reading may appear to be 
"a passive process of absorption," but Rosenblatt instead insists, it is "an 
intense personal activity" (Literature v).
To stress a reader's active role, Rosenblatt compares a text to a musical 
score and asserts that readers need "to learn to perform in response to a text" 
(Literature 279). Like a musician, a literary reader should develop the 
positive freedom to act in relation to a text. This initial experience only 
begins an interpretive performance because "a spontaneous response should 
be the first step towards increasingly mature" reflections (Literature 75). After 
this first response, a reader can develop greater knowledge of a literary work 
through an interpretive method that corresponds to Dewey's constructive 
process of inquiry.
Citing Dewey, Rosenblatt explains, the development of interpretive 
knowledge usually begins with some felt difficulty, an uncertain or a
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contradictory response to a text (Literature 226). To resolve a difficulty, the 
framing, speculating, and discriminating that are primarily intuitive during 
an initial response must become much more deliberate. Rosenblatt requires 
a reader to seek not only an initial response but also to ask "What in the text 
justifies [this] response?" (Literature 282). In contrast to Pater's 
impressionistic criticism, Rosenblatt's interpretive method returns a reader's 
attention to the text, but it also turns a reader's attention towards two 
directions a New Critic would not permit.
To resolve an interpretive difficulty, Rosenblatt's reader should follow 
"ever widening circles of interest" that radiate from her initial responses to 
the text (Literature 117). These widening interests also expand beyond the 
text to the cultural context of the writer and the work. A reader could seek 
biographical information, such as on Keats' short life, to understand better 
his recurrent theme of fleeting beauty. Or a reader could examine the cultural 
context of Elizabethan drama, for example, to appreciate the significance of 
the drunken porter's comedy in Shakespeare's tragedy Macbeth (Literature 
117). These widening circles of interest expand not only beyond the text to 
the cultural contexts but also before the text to the reader. As a pragmatist, 
Rosenblatt places any single act of cognition within the context of previously 
accepted beliefs so textual interpretation should involve "the parallel effort to 
. . . understand and evaluate [a reader's! personal emphases" or prior 
knowledge (Literature 96). Using student-centered discussions and other 
collaborative activities, a reader's assumptions can be foregrounded for 
examination. 4
As readers become aware of the possible, alternative responses made by 
other readers, "the unspoken assumptions behind [their] own judgments" 
can be examined (Literature 120). This examination of one's own tacit
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traditions requires a reader to consider the pragmatist concern of language's 
influence upon an individual's thoughts. For many of these previously 
unarticulated beliefs "have been unconsciously absorbed from the society 
about" (Literature 253). Once reading has been recognized as "deeply 
conditioned by the social context," a reader can learn to try on and take off 
many cultural beliefs like a Deweyan individual engaged in intellectual 
disrobing (Reader 135). Reading, for example, Richard W right's frequently 
anthologized "The Man Who Was Almost A Man" can prom pt privileged 
students to reconsider conventional assumptions about male maturity and 
individual responsibility. If a reader considers this story's historical context of 
Post-Reconstruction share-cropping and fGan lynchings, then the applicability 
of these dominant beliefs to the main character Dave Sanders becomes 
questionable. 5
As some students first understand the influence of social discourses, 
Rosenblatt cautions, they "may think of the individual as completely at the 
mercy of the dominant [ideological| forces . . . .  This is as erroneous, of course, 
as is the earlier notion that the individual has complete free choice and self- 
determination" (Literature 254). Between these extremes, Rosenblatt asserts, 
"We can recognize the shaping power of . . . culture, yet we should 
understand the possibilities of choice . . . [within] our complex culture" 
('Transactional" 384-85). For a pragmatist like Rosenblatt, there always is 
"an individual hum an being choosing, selectively constructing meaning, and 
consciously and unconsciously responding" to specific situations 
('Transactional" 385). As explained in the previous chapter, an individual is 
always involved in the continuation of society and its discourses so we 
should seek more deliberate and critical consideration of the alternatives. 
Thus, "we no longer need [toj accept [the dominant ideologyJ as unthinkingly
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as the air we breathe . . . .  we [instead can| have the knowledge to consciously 
influence the future development of our customs and institutions" 
(Literature 159). By seeking the intelligent activity Dewey promoted, non-
foundational agency is attainable.
Rosenblatt is careful not to guarantee the achievement of greater 
agency through literary reading alone. Similar to Dewey stating his later 
reservations about education leading social reform, Rosenblatt warns: "The 
mere reading of a play by Shakespeare or a novel by George Eliot or Henry 
James cannot in itself be expected to wipe out the effect of all the desensitizing 
[social] influences" (Literature 93). Yet she maintains, practicing the 
pragmatist process of literary interpretation "can be a means of helping 
students to develop conscious resistance to those [social] influences" because 
it can foster the habits of thought that allow an individual to become a more 
reflexive and critical agent (Literature 93).
Rosenblatt's reader response pedagogy demonstrates that Dewey's 
philosophic principles can be enacted to teach students to achieve greater 
non-foundational agency. When this pragmatist literary theory is compared 
to Murray's and Elbow's composition instruction, Dewey's tacit tradition for 
these writing process theorists can be articulated. We need to heed the 
pragmatist principles of the primacy of experience, the constructive process of 
knowing, the influence of language upon thought, and the achievement of 
agency already at work within writing process theories, for when we do, their 
resounding relevance to the postmodern impasse will be heard.
Murray's and Elbow's Pragmatist Construction of Knowledge from Experience
Like Dewey in theory and Rosenblatt in practice, Murray accepts the 
initial responses of student writers. He too begins with the starting point of
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pragmatist philosophy -  the primacy of experience — by placing his trust in 
student writers' already "extensive contact w ith life and language" (Learning 
152). He urges them to get words on paper, for once they begin to participate 
in the writing process, he is confident they can learn to write and  write to 
learn. Student writers must learn to "write badly before [they! write well" 
(Learning 49). Once student writers have placed these initial words on a 
page, they can learn to revise this "productive jumble" into a better
interpretation of experience (W rite  33).
Murray's process of writing "to learn, to explore, [andj to discover" 
expands towards Rosenblatt's widening circles of interest and conforms to 
Dewey's constructive process of knowledge (Write 3). Like the expanding 
interests of Rosenblatt's reader from response to text and from text to contexts 
and on to another response, Murray describes the writing process as "an 
experimental art" because a writer must "try it, step back, observe, think, 
redefine the problem, redesign the experiment, [andj try again" (Expecting 
134). Yet in order to discern and discuss the writing process, Murray explains, 
"we must stop time (and therefore the process itself) and examine the single 
elements . . .  in unnatural isolation" (Learning 18). Like Dewey's 
constructive theory of knowledge, Murray believes the writing process 
follows a "logical, understandable process" that involves collecting, ordering, 
focusing, developing, and clarifying (W rite  4). A writer's actual experience of 
composing, of course, is far messier that this description, and Murray is 
careful to explain that writing is a recursive rather than a linear process.
Like Dewey's non-foundational epistemology, Murray's theory of 
writing begins and ends with experience. He teaches student writers to 
approach ordinary events, such as a grandm other’s death, with an "open
susceptibility" (A Writer 2). While student writers collect a "necessary
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abundance" of information, Murray advises them to look for the creative 
tensions, the Deweyan felt difficulties that can lead to "experiments in 
meaning" (Write 63, Expecting 23). As a problem is defined, a student writer 
should create a tentative idea that Murray variously refers to as a lead, a line, 
and a focus. A writer follows this focus by developing and clarifying during 
which various possibilities are tested against the emerging text, memory, and 
literary expectations. As he tries one phrase or image then another, Murray's 
commentaries about a draft under revision reveal the experimental quality of 
his composing process (for example, see Write 253-4). Murray, as much as 
Dewey, subscribes to a constructive theory of knowledge so he compares a 
text to a photograph because "slowly, it evolves" and his pragmatist 
predecessor similarly asserts "to express . . .  is to carry forward in 
development" (Writer 11, Art 62).
Elbow too upholds the pragmatist principles of the primacy of 
experience and the constructive process of knowing. Like Dewey, he asserts 
"an epistemology of experience" in which a writer begins by trying "to hold [a 
preconceived] theory at bay . . . [and] articulate what happens" ("Uses" 67). 
Elbow, for example, encourages students to write discourse that renders as 
much as the academic discourse that explains favored by David Bartholomae. 
As this non-academic writing "conveys to others a sense of [the writer's! 
experience," this rendering discourse "often yields im p o rtan t. . . insights such 
as helping us see an exception [to] or a contradiction" of prior beliefs 
("Reflections" 136, 137). Similar to an initial response by Rosenblatt's reader, 
this first rendering of an experience by Elbow's writer can reveal felt 
difficulties that fuel the construction of new knowledge.
Like Dewey, Elbow considers knowledge to be a "process of 
interpretation" from experience (Embracing 298). He identifies the two
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fundamental forces of the constructive process of knowing; for Elbow, they 
are his believing and doubting games. The believing game does not seek 
immediately "to construct or defend an argument but rather to transmit [or 
enlargel an experience" ("Shifting" 288). Believing supports creating, and 
doubting fosters criticizing by "drain[ingj the experience from an idea and 
see[ingj . . .  its pure propositionality" (Embracing 263). Although Elbow's 
critics ignore his advocacy of the latter, he always has described writing as the 
creative development and  critical evaluation of meaning. The alternating 
forces of believing and doubting, of creating and criticizing propel a writer 
from felt difficulty to the problem definition and later from the formed 
hypothesis to the deliberate experimentation of Dewey's constructive process.
Murray and Elbow conceive of experience just as James defines it; for 
these two writing process theorists and this pragmatist philosopher, 
experience is a "double-barrelled word"(James qtd. by Dewey EN  10). By this 
definition, James means that experience involves both an immediate activity 
and its interpretation as knowledge. Through his advocacy of creative 
freewriting and believing (in relation to criticizing and doubting), Elbow has 
only sought to balance the two fundamental and contradictory forces of the 
constructive process of knowing. Neither Elbow, nor Murray advocates the 
primacy of experience in order to preclude the development of knowledge. 
Murray values descriptive and narrative writing that renders experience, but 
he also considers analysis to be "as important to the writer . . .  as the wrench is 
to the mechanic" so he encourages students to write reflective narratives 
(W rite  142). In these "personal, but . . . not private" essays, there should be 
both "immediacy and detachment" (Write  100).
When Murray begins to construct meaning from experience through 
writing, it is with the desire to see "what I have to say in the hope that what I
78
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
discover will be significant' (Expecting 89). Yet Murray makes clear that a 
text's significance can never be determined by only the writer. Just as 
Rosenblatts reader considers the responses made by others, a construction of 
meaning by Murray's writer is verified by its consequences for others. In the 
first edition of ,4 Writer Teaches Writing from 1968, Murray stipulates that a 
writer "may write for himself, but he does not write to himself," and he 
elaborates, "the writer does not exist without a reader [because) the purpose of 
writing is . . .  to convey information" to another (3). Murray subsequently 
has enriched his notion of this verifying reader by positing the existence of a 
writer’s ’’other self” who anticipates public responses to a text ( Learning 
167). Murray's "other self' perceives a draft just as Dewey describes an artist 
viewing a developing image "as a third person might" (Art 106).
Although Murray insists on the influential role of an "other" in this 
constructive process of knowing, his writing theory has been reductively 
categorized as an impulsive, solipsistic pressing out or 'ex-pressing' of a 
Romantic self beyond inhibiting layers of social conventions -- hence the label 
"expressivism." 6 Yet a writer's "other self" is able to anticipate public 
responses for Murray, and according to Elbow, a writer is able to close her 
eyes, to ignore her audience while composing because writers can never 
isolate themselves completely from the influences of social discourses (Elbow 
"Closing" 61-2). The discrepancy between Murray's and Elbow's writing 
process theories and  the "expressivist" label created by their critics is so 
glaring, the time has come to ask why this inaccurate categorization, or 
should I say - caricaturization, persists. Like Lisa Delpit discussing the process 
vs. product debate, I believe this contest between "The Competing Theories of 
the Writing Process" -- to borrow the title of one of its originators -- is "an 
illusion created . . .  by academics whose world view demands the creation of
7 9
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
categorical divisions . . . for . . . easier analysis" (Delpit 296, see Faigley 
"Competing"). I also agree with Tomas O'Donnell who asserts, "critics of 
expressivism seem committed to attacking straw rhetorics of their ow n  
making" ( 426, italics added).
The history of contemporary composition could be beneficially 
rewritten if we considered cognitive process and social process theories of 
writing as developments of as much as departures from the writing process 
theories of Murray, Elbow, and their contemporaries. 7 Social epistemic 
composition theories can be deemed developments from Murray's and 
Elbow's pedagogies if the pragmatist tradition of the modem writing process 
movement is articulated, for Dewey heralds the contemporary concern for 
language. Then the best aspects of Murray's and Elbow's composition theories 
can be explained and extended until they bridge the apparent epistemological 
chasm that divides them from the most effective practices of postmodern 
writing instruction.
Assuming and Acknowledging Language's Influence Upon Thought
Despite criticisms to the contrary, Murray and Elbow do assume that a 
writer is immersed in language. They do not believe that a writer's thought 
or "inner vision finally exists apart from language" as Berlin claims (Rhetoric 
152-3). Writing, for Murray, is "a process of discovery through language," and 
his writing process pedagogy depends upon the influential currents of 
discursive practices (Learning 15). Murray encourages student writers to 
follow "meaning-searching language" and to "allow language to lead [them! 
to meaning" (Expecting 45, Learning 74). 8 Writers are able to begin 
composing without critically considering their readers or their purposes 
because they can let themselves be supported by the buoyant medium of
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language. Rather than urging a writer to swim deliberately after 
predetermined intentions, Murray advises against trying to establish one's 
purposes too quickly (Learning 44). Instead writers should begin composing 
by floating uncritically upon discursive currents by brainstorming, 
freewriting, and mapping.
Although Murray's pedagogy depends upon a writer's immersion in 
discourse, it is true that he rarely states this implicit assumption as an explicit 
acknowledgment. Yet this omission does not mean that "once [students] 
start grappling — on the page— with meanings," Murray's writing process 
pedagogy fails to "help [students! see how the traditions of form and language 
help clarify thinking" (Expecting 103). This quotation by Murray himself 
suggests otherwise because in its entirety he states, "once [students] start 
grappling — on the page— with meanings, we [instructors] can help them see 
how the traditions of form and language help clarify thinking." Murray, 
however, has not explained an instructor's "help[ingj" a student understand 
this pragmatist principle in great detail. Yet this failure to elaborate by 
Murray does not mean a writing process theorist cannot do so. For Elbow has 
acknowledged the influence of social discourses upon a writer's thinking, and 
he has advanced several practices that enable students to appreciate 
language's influence without underm ining their potential agency.
In contrast to Murray, Elbow repeatedly acknowledges language's 
influence upon an individual's thought. A writer, he declares, is "immersed 
in discourse itself," and freewriting "exploits the autonomous generative 
powers of language and syntax" ("Shifting" 287, Embracing 59). For skeptics 
who may wonder whether Elbow finally is heeding his critics, it is important 
to note that even in his earliest texts, Elbow acknowledges this discursive 
immersion, in Writing Without Teachers (1973), Elbow locates writers and
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readers in "speech communities" to explain interpretation as a transactional 
process much like Rosenblatt's theory (155). And in "The Value of Dialectic" 
(1975), he recognizes that "the hallmark of the twentieth century" is 
examining "the limitations of that system we work in most closely, the one 
whose blind spots are hardest to notice: language" (Embracing 245). As he 
acknowledges language's influence, Elbow is well aware that others have 
concluded that a writer is "written by language," but he is able to avoid the 
postmodern impasse of agency ('Tow ard" 209).
Like his pragmatist predecessors and his postmodern critics, Elbow 
realizes that a w riter's immersion in discourse means that every individual is 
engaged in constant collaborative relationships with others. Dewey's 
previously quoted assertion that "a composition conceived in the head . . .  is 
public in its significant content" could be attributed to Elbow. For this writing 
process theorist states, "we can carry on thinking, writing, and even talking, 
while alone on a deserted island, but in doing so we are living off capital 
accumulated through a community process" (Embracing 293). According to 
Elbow, the physical isolation of a deserted island or even a quiet study cannot 
be confused with the ways of believing shared by language users. These two 
quotations are so similar because Elbow's writing process theory is "living off" 
the pragmatist principles "accumulated" by Dewey, James, and Peirce, a debt 
Elbow has begun to repay with interest.
In 'The Uses of Binary Thinking," Elbow identifies "John Dewey" as 
one notable thinker among several unnamed others w ho recognizes that 
"either/or thinking is the problem" in the current controversy over whether 
writing is either a social or an individual process (60). Elbow does not cite 
Dewey's almost verbatim warning against our tendency to "formulate beliefs 
in terms of Eithers/Ors" (EE 17), but he does quote the similar assertion:
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'The very idea of education is the freeing of individual  capacity in a 
progressive growth directed to social aims" from Dewey's Democracy and 
Education (qtd. in "Uses" 76, n.16) And in another recent article, he echoes 
Rosenblatt as well as Dewey when he insists, "the personal . . . need not be at 
war with the social. The personal and the social are [often| reciprocal" 
("Foreword" 13). It is this pragmatist transaction between self and society that 
Elbow enacts in even his earliest textbooks.
In Writing Without Teachers and Writing With Power, Elbow 
conceives of writing as not an either/or matter, but as both an individual and  
a social process.* In W W T ,  Elbow is more concerned with an individual 
writer creating initial material than fulfilling a teacher's critical standards for 
a final text. The apparently individual act of creating through even 
freewriting, however, is supported by peer response groups who try to 
believe a writer's draft in order to encourage further invention, and 
generation is only the first of Elbow's two explicitly stated goals. As 
Christopher Burnham notes, the second is "to improve [the writer's) ability to 
make [one'sj own judgment about which . . . writing to keep and . . . throw 
away" (Elbow qtd. 164, italics original). Yet this individual judgment, like 
that by Rosenblatt's reader, is fostered by considering the responses made by 
others. Elbow's writer must assume the responsibility for revision that the 
traditional teacher's red pen took from many students, but these decisions are 
aided by knownng what material elicited the strongest and weakest reactions 
by the supportive readers. The social group represented by the peer 
responders enable the individual writer to make more informed choices. 
W W T ,  Burnham further observes, is only a "prelude" to W W P  in which
‘Given their similar titles, Elbow's two early textbooks will be identified as 
W W T  and WWP in subsequent references.
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response groups are "used for both support and evaluation in an effort 
to help a writer develop voice" (166).
In WWP,  evaluation becomes an overt concern, and peer responders 
practice critical doubting as well as supportive believing. Informed by the 
responses of the social group, the writer seeks a powerful voice that can 
communicate with the reader. This voice is not the revelation of a prior self; 
it is the construction of a contingent persona required by meaning and 
audience. It is only by distorting the purpose of peer response as eliminating 
"inauthentic writing" that Berlin and others can claim that Elbow (and 
Murray) "deny the intersubjective, social processes of writing" (Rhetoric 14, 
146). Yet as the guidelines of analytical responding, for example, demonstrate 
Elbow's writer is engaged in a collaborative, social relationship with her 
readers as they offer other supports for, possible objections against, and 
alternative conceptions of a main claim (see Sharing 27-8). Like Dewey 
advocating the "associated life" and even a postmodernist focusing on the 
'o ther/ Elbow advances a composition theory in which the individual 
develops through social activity (Dewey Democracy 401).
Like Bumham, I believe Elbow's critics have overlooked his Deweyan 
conception of the individual and society because they do not treat his earliest 
textbooks as the theoretical statements that they are. Although these texts 
were written primarily for a "non-scholarly audiences," they do formulate a 
theoretical explanation of composing that closely corresponds to Deweyan 
pragmatism (Burnham 155). Anyone who doubts the theoretical 
sophistication of W W T , for example, should note Elbow's references to 
Tertullian, Descartes, and Thomas Kuhn, especially when the final figure's 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was not widely known when this 
'textbook' was published (149,150, 166).
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When Elbow has written for a scholarly audience, he accept some 
responsibility, but let me stress very little, for his critics' confusion. In "Uses," 
Elbow explains his theory of writing as both an individual and a social 
process, yet he inexplicably changes one of the terms of this controversy. He 
substitutes the word "private" for individual. He defends his theory by 
asserting that writing is both a "private" and a "social" process (60). He 
acknowledges the facile argument that composing is always social because 
"language comes to us from the outside," but he adds, "the language we speak 
and write also comes to us from the inside" (60).
By considering language as a bo th /and  process, Elbow is able to explain 
that it is the social aspect of language that stimulates individual 
development, and during this development, it is the individual aspect that 
maintains and remakes social discourses. Thus, language involves the 
"private" and the "inside," meaning the individual, just as much as the 
"outside/ meaning the social. Elbow's critics, unfortunately, have not heeded 
Dewey's warning against either/or thinking as well so they consider his 
argument for the individual as a denial of the social. Yet Elbow explicitly 
states, the individual and the social as "opposed sides can work together and 
reinforce each other" in one theory of composing (61, italics original). The 
entire controversy over expressive vs. social epistemic composition 
pedagogies is itself another failure to avoid either/ or thinking.
The Achievement of Agency by Pragmatist Writing Process Students
With the acknowledgement of language's influence by writing process 
theorists, the potential agency of Elbow's and M urray's composition students 
can be explained and extended. For pragmatism explains two practices Elbow 
has championed: freewriting and the believing and doubting games that
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foster greater non-foundational agency. Dewey's tacit tradition also can extend 
the best aspects of Murray's pedagogy so that its current categorization as 
"expressivist" becomes even more intellectually untenable and absurd.
As theorized and practiced by Elbow, freewriting enables a writer to 
generate meaning because "words call up words, ideas call up more ideas" 
(Embracing 59). A writer, "immersed in language" as Elbow acknowledges, 
uses this unplanned, exploratory prose to exploit language's own generative 
powers ("Shifting" 287). Yet this power of language to conjure more language 
is not necessarily so great that the writer ultimately is the one exploited, taken 
advantage of by the dom inant discourses. Through the unplanned invention 
stimulated by freewriting, a w riter may be able to disrupt as much as follow 
the conventional currents of discourse because according to Elbow, 
freewriting harnesses "the m ind's capacity for chaos and disorganization" 
("Shifting" 288). When practiced well, this unplanned composing is one 
form of what Elbow refers to as "first order thinking" which is the ability to 
construct new conceptual term s from experience (Without draw ing an 
absolute dichotomy, Elbow distinguishes this first order thinking from the 
second-order which involves the ability to apply already-known concepts to 
new experiences; see Embracing 55). 9 The first order thinking fostered by 
freewriting can "lead the person spontaneously to formulate conceptual 
insights that are remarkably shrewd" as demonstrated by Elbow's own insight 
that, contrary to common belief, speech sometimes is better considered 
indelible and writing, ephemeral — an insight I soon will discuss to explain 
Elbow's exemplary demonstration of the agency achieved through his 
believing and doubting games (Embracing 56, italics original).
Elbow believes that unplanned exploratory prose can stimulate fresh 
insights rather than just reproduce discursive influences because he does not
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conceive of language as a monolithic whole that predetermines the 
perception and  expression of every new experience. Instead, he considers 
language to consist of multiple discourse, or speech, communities. In W W T ,  
he cautions, 'T he  picture [of language] is oversimplified, however, if we talk 
of only one  speech community" (155, italics original). Elbow's more complex 
image of "many overlapping speech communities for each individual" 
provides the discursive space for personal agency (155). Although the explicit 
topic of Elbow's discussion of speech communities is the interpretive abilities 
of individual readers, his theory of their agency applies to writers as well. 
Elbow describes the "constant tug of war" between individuals who create 
new meanings and discursive communities that "curb this looseness" (154). 
Like Dewey, Elbow considers language to be a series of "flexible transactions 
among people" so both the process and the products of language use must be 
considered (156). The process of individuals using language leads to subtle 
variation and stark invention, and the products maintained by a specific 
community limit this alteration and addition. Yet for neither Elbow, nor 
Dewey can the existing product of one discourse community completely 
control the ongoing activity of the individual agent. Elbow likens an 
individual's alteration of meaning to a "dream-like fluidity," but agency does 
not have to depend upon only the unconscious invention of freewriting 
(155).
As freewriting exploits the generative power of language, it also 
exposes the conventional currents of discourse to scrutiny so an author does 
not have to be conceived as being written by language. For Elbow, "valuing 
experience . . . [does not leave] the articulation of experience unchallenged" 
(O'Donnell 436). Like an initial response reconsidered by Rosenblatt's reader, 
a first draft by an individual freewriting places felt difficulties onto the page
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where they can be identified and Dewey's constructive process of inquiry can 
begin. Elbow explains, writers "can think better when they examine their 
thoughts . . .  as a string of assertions arranged in space" across a page rather 
than in the mist of the mind ("Shifting" 284). To encourage this conscious 
consideration of our ways of believing, I, for example, ask the students of my 
process-oriented composition course to freewrite about three words: 
"writing," "composing" and "experimenting" in order to foreground their 
assumptions about the first concept. The word "writing" too often functions 
as a synecdoche; one part - transcription represents the whole - composing so 
the experimental process of constructing meaning is obscured, hence ignored 
(see Brodkey 398). The equally problematic assumptions that many first year 
student writers have about "revision" and "research" also can be addressed 
by asking students to freewrite about these crucial terms of composing. Thus, 
freewriting can function, as Elbow states, as "Both an invitation to become 
less self-conscious about writing" and "to increase our awareness of what we 
have written" ('Tow ard" 210). This pragmatist analysis of freewriting 
explains its efficacy to exploit a writer's social ways of believing and to expose 
them to deliberate scrutiny.
A Deweyan writing instructor likewise could extend Murray's classic 
assignment by taking the personal essay for a wider social turn without 
reaching the postmodern impasse. This assignment still would develop from 
the primacy of the writer’s experience. The student still would narrate a 
significant life experience, yet a Deweyan instructor would ask the student to 
reflect not just on the significance of the experience itself as Murray does but 
also on the cultural assumptions implicit within the narration which 
influence her reflections.
To encourage a student to reflect on these cultural influences, a
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pragmatist instructor would pose questions not usually asked in process- 
oriented draft comments and writing conferences. For example, when I was 
teaching a process-oriented first-year writing course, one student named 
Brian wrote about trying to maintain a friendship with an openly gay student 
named Todd. Brian, who was a talented performer, described practicing dance 
steps and songs with Todd for an upcoming college musical. Although these 
practices were productive and enjoyable, Brian did not want to be considered 
by others as being too 'friendly' with this homosexual student. As a self­
described 'artsy' heterosexual, Brian worried about being labeled -  in his own 
words — a 'fag' by an intolerant peer. During our actual conference, I probably 
asked Brian such typical process-oriented questions as "Was there a specific 
incident that made you worry about being associated too closely with Todd?," 
"Are you trying to answer an intolerant student, to explain your concerns to 
Todd, or to examine your own concerns?," and "How has this experience 
made you think and act differently?"
To extend the efficacy of Murray's pedagogy and become more of a 
Deweyan instructor, I should have asked Brian to consider the cultural 
assumptions perpetuated by language, to reflect on the discursive practices 
that influence his own stated ambivalence towards homosexuality. A possible 
question for a showing detail, a Murrayan "revealing specific," might have 
made him mention a dislike for homosexual graffiti in public bathrooms that 
solicits impersonal sexual encounters (Write  61). I then could have asked 
him to consider the dominant terms for a participant in such encounters. A 
heterosexual male who engages in loveless sexual encounters is commonly 
referred to as a 'stud,' and a heterosexual female who does so is crudely 
known as a 'slut.' A homosexual male, regardless of whether his sexuality is 
expressed in a loving relationship or not, is called a 'fag.' An analysis of these
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terms may have led Brian to consider the "tremendous effect" of language on 
our beliefs that Dewey asserts.
By confronting the conventional discourse of homophobia, Brian may 
have begun to practice the intellectual disrobing, the critical foregrounding of 
one belief against a background of other accepted assertions that Devvev 
advocates. Brian could have examined the effects of "wearing" the discourse 
of homophobia and that of tolerance. He might have questioned why some 
heterosexual men enjoy accusing other males of being a 'fag.' What 
behaviors elicit this accusation? Why can some of these behaviors, such as 
tears or touching, be construed very differently if they occur on a sports field 
or a theatrical stage? Why does the patriarchal culture d raw  such an abrupt 
yet ambiguous distinction between male bonding and homosexual desire? Is 
sexual intimacy between two loving people more im portant than the 
patriarchal distinction between 'stud ' and 'fag'? If loving intimacy between 
any two people is more important than homophobic intolerance against same 
sex intimacy, then does this assertion conflict with any other beliefs? Do any 
of those beliefs silence an assertion that loving intimacy is more important 
than homophobic intolerance?
Like Murray, a Deweyan instructor would want a student to engage in a 
process of discovery. Murray has been much criticized for his his emphasis on 
discovery, his insistence that "students become writers at the moment when 
they first write what they do not expect" (Expecting 3). Yet Murray 
emphasizes discovery because only then are student writers engaged in a 
constructive process of inquiry. Both Murray and Dewey have few illusions 
about the originality of these discoveries. Murray believes a "writer's 
illusion of innocence is essential" because it motivates writing, but he 
immediately stipulates all of a writer's "problems have been worked out by . .
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. other[sJ" (Learning 8). Dewey also cautions, "Mo one expects the young to 
make original discoveries" (Democracy 354).
By pursuing this process of discovery through language even more 
than M urray acknowledges, Brian could have critical examined his ways of 
believing and achieved greater agency. If Brian had decided that he believed 
loving intimacy was more important than homophobic intolerance, he 
would have been draw n into a transactional relationship with language itself 
because the terms of homophobia are incompatible with this belief. Like 
advocates of homosexual tolerance who have foregrounded the American 
discourse of personal liberty, he may have considered the conflict between the 
cultural discourses of homophobic intolerance and individual freedom and 
concluded that the same-sex intimacy some refer to as 'an unnatural acf is 
better conceived as a 'sexual preference.' He could have begin to participate in 
the deliberate reconstruction of discursive practices that postmodernists often 
overlook in theory. He could have learned to be an agent of ideas without 
ever imagining himself to be the sole author of these thoughts. 10
One of Elbow's and Murray's critics may object to my pragmatist 
extension of their writing process pedagogies. They may claim that my 
Deweyan version of their composition theories seems as unrecognizable as I 
consider their "expressivist" caricature to be, but Elbow's believing and 
doubting games represent the fundamental forces of a deliberate Deweyan 
re -construction of our current ways of believing. Elbow advocates believing 
and doubting in order to try on and  take off particular ways of believing, and 
by this Deweyan act of intellectual disrobing, Elbow himself demonstrates 
that greater non-foundation agency can be achieved.
In 'T he  Shifting Relationship between Thought and Speech," Elbow 
believes and doubts the dominant assumption about talk and text that have
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been built into language, he begins by believing, or consciously trying on, the 
dominant beliefs that speech is ephemeral and writing is indelible. Speech, 
he states, is ephemeral because it can be heard only once. Writing, in contrast, 
is indelible because it is recorded on the more permanent page. Elbow then 
doubts or, takes off, these assumptions that have persisted since Greek 
Antiquity. Speech can be considered indelible because once we have spoken, 
our words can never be retracted, only amended. Writing can be ephemeral 
if a writer's first draft is not the final public one; with revision, print ceases to 
be permanent. Elbow then advocates revised freewriting because it combines 
the spontaneity and specificity of speech with the revisibility and reflexivity of 
writing (see 285-91). Although Elbow may seem to be like Jacques Derrida 
deconstructing a binary opposition between speech and writing, his analysis 
actually relies on Dewey's dialectical thinking, the pragmatist preference for 
maintaining the creative tension between both /and rather than eliminating 
either one or the other extreme. For Elbow not only has demonstrated but 
also advocated this Deweyan dialectic of believing and doubting in theory and 
in practice.
In 'T he Value of Dialectic," Elbow advocates the dialectical thinking 
that keeps two opposed assertions in creative tension by affirming and 
questioning each one. On the issue of free will vs. determinism, Elbow offers 
the example: "If I think of my behavior as free, the best way to notice and 
understand behavior that was hidden from me is to try to see it as 
determined" (Embracing 241). Like Dewey, Elbow avoids the tendency to 
think in terms of either/or extremes. He instead encourages a dialectical 
thinker "to search for potential contradictions . . .  to heighten them by 
affirming both sides rather than by trying to resolve or eliminate them 
immediately" (Embracing 251). After believing each assertion to reach its
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limitations, Elbow then advises a dialectical thinker to doubt both in any way 
possible, to deliberately disrupt the previous affirmation. Through this 
conscious trying on and taking off of beliefs, Elbow hopes a thinker may be 
able to achieve a more critical understanding, and possibly - alternative 
conceptions, of the assertions examined. Even then he does not engage in 
simple either/o r thinking, for he advises the previous way of believing may 
be considered as a "subset of the larger one, a special case that does not really 
contradict [the alternative belief] if [it is] correctly restricted" (Embracing 251). 
Elbow follows his own advice when he "restrict[s]" the role of doubting and 
the related criticizing to later stages of composing without denying its final 
importance for effective composing.
Elbow has encouraged writing students to practice this dialectic of 
believing and doubting. In one of his earliest publications, Elbow describes a 
"non-disciplinary" -- or what we now call, an interdisciplinary -- course in 
which writing students examine a "single concrete particular" from "the 
widest range of conflicting models, metaphors, hypotheses, conceptual 
schemes and disciplines" (Embracing 9). By considering this range of 
conceptual alternatives, a student is encouraged to apply, or believe, known 
concepts to new experiences, Elbow's second-order thinking. The resulting 
conflict of these multiple concepts causes a student to doubt each one as well. 
This Deweyan act of trying on and taking off various concepts can provoke 
Elbow's first order thinking which creates new concepts to understand better 
an experience. More recently Elbow has suggested this intellectual disrobing 
and redesigning by asking students to write two essays on one topic for two 
different audiences. The contrast between the discourse expected by an 
academic audience and the language desired by a non-academic reader tests 
the writer's knowledge and exposes the influence of language, such as
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academic terms and colloquial phrases, upon this knowledge ("Reflections" 
137, 151). Elbow wants to teach his students "the principle of discourse 
variation" so they learn to recognize the "different perceptions and reactions" 
that result from different discourses, to realize language's tremendous effect 
("Reflections" 152).
By theorizing, practicing, and teaching believing and doubting, Elbow
avoids committing the philosophic fallacy and creating false dualisms. He
does not extract one concept, such as the social, from experience and then
treat it as an absolute with which to consider the entire experience of writing.
He instead has drawn upon his own experiences as a blocked writer to create a
theory of both creating and criticizing, both believing and doubting, and both
individual and social. As Elbow explains, "My thinking grew out of a process
of trying to be true to my experience and to find a theory that didn 't violate it"
("Uses" 65). Thus, Elbow's theory not only asserts the primacy of experience,
it also demonstrates the construction of knowledge from this first pragmatist
principle. And Elbow is aware of the philosophical origins of his
epistemological practices. He has made explicit references to "William James
and John Dewey" to explain the development of the modem writing process
movement ("Uses" 65). Elbow has connected the pragmatist
emphasis on experience [to| the work of . . . Macrorie, Britton, Murray, 
myself, and others. What these figures had in comm on. . .  was a 
burgeoning interest in the 'experience' of writing . . . .  People wanted to 
talk about experience during the process of writing, not just the resultant 
text as product. 'Process' connotes experience. ("The Uses " 66)
Elbow furthermore correlates the "opening period of the 'process' 
movement" in composition studies to the corresponding interest in a reader's 
experience -- the reader response movement led Louise Rosenblatt whom he 
fails to name ("Uses" 67). Yet as I have tried to show, the writing process and
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reader response movements are parallel developments that both follow the 
philosophical principles of Deweyan pragmatism.
It's time for contemporary composition scholars to practice Dewey's
intellectual disrobing; it's time to take off the conventional conceptions of
writing as either expressivism or social constructionism and try on a
pragmatist design for composition. It's time to reject the reductive,
dismissive, and just plain wrong categorization of Murray and Elbow as
"expressivists." As Elbow himself objects,
What really needs explaining is why there is such a tendency to see me 
as one-sided and extreme, to see me as someone only interested in 
generating, making a mess, and the private dimension; to be blind to my 
my support for critical thinking, revising, doubting, and the social 
dimension in writing - when I preach over and over this theme of 
embracing contraries and of trying to get opposites into unresolved 
tension with each other. ("Uses" 70)
Elbow can support his objection that the social aspects of his writing process 
theory have bee overlooked by his critics. For he has identified his assertion 
of language generating freewriting, of the believing game, and of peer 
response as three examples of his contribution to the social aspects of writing 
("Foreword" 16). Elbow always has enacted a process-oriented pedagogy in 
which students are "writ[ingj to each other . . . [and comment[ing| on each 
other's writings" ("Closing" 64). It does not require a large theoretical 
reorientation to connect Elbow's collaborative course to Bartholomae's 
learning sequence pedagogy, especially if one remembers the sequential 
writing assignments of another supposed 'expressivist' - William Coles in 
The Plural I. When the tacit tradition of Deweyan pragmatism is articulated 
within the writing process theories of Donald Murray and Peter Elbow, I 
believe it is possible to explain and extend the best aspects of writing process. 
And by this extension, these pragmatist practices can be combined with the
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most effective elements of postmodern instruction. Dewey has drawn 
course beyond the current impasse over agency, and we have only begun 
heed the possibilities of this new direction.
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CHAPTER FOUR NOTES
1. This quotation comes from a rejection letter received by Murray that 
criticized his anonymous submission for being "merely expressive" and too 
"Murrayesque" (Murray "But" 2). This kind of reductive and dismissive 
response to writing process theorists is widespread. For example, at the 1996 
College Composition and Communications Conference, one presenter 
cautioned against the rise of the new expressivism which he warned was the 
same as Elbow's original expressivism based on the 'authentic se lf — a phrase 
and concept that only appears in the analyses of Berlin and other critics, but 
not in any of Elbow's own work. Like Christopher Burnham, 1 believe 
"existing scholarship does not offer a close reading of [the] primary texts" by 
Elbow and other writing process theorists (155).
2. Rosenblatt, for example, admits her debt by stating, "Dewey's Art as 
Experience especially left its mark . . . [with] its vision of aesthetic values 
woven into the texture of . . . daily life," and Dewey's own change in 
terminology from 'interaction' to 'transaction' was crucial to Rosenblatt's 
successive editions of Literature as Exploration (Reader xi).
3. Similar to Dewey, Rosenblatt adamantly opposes any false dualisms 
between text and reader or reader and writer. As a reader engages with a text, 
he "selects out and synthesizes - interanimates - his responses to the author's 
patterns of words" through "a continuing, constructive 'shaping' activity" 
(Reader 53). Although a reader is an active participant in a literary 
transaction, she should not dominate this process of interpretation. 
Rosenblatt's pragmatist emphasis on the reader does not disregard the 
significance of the literary products created by writers and other skilled 
readers. Rosenblatt carefully stipulates, "Nothing 1 have said . . . denies that 
the text is the outward and visible result of an author's creative activity" 
(Reader 15). Unlike the postmodernists Barthes and Derrida or even the 
contemporary reader response theorists such as Stanley Fish and Jonathan 
Culler w ith whom she is often associated, Rosenblatt's rebirth of the reader 
does not require the author's death. Nor does her emphasis on the student 
reader demand that the exemplary interpretations of published critics be 
ignored. Rosenblatt only cautions that published criticism should only be 
read after, and not before, a studenfs experience with a text. Criticism can 
help clarify a studenfs own responses, but it should never replace them. A 
literature teacher should never try to transmit these prior readings to 
students as though they should be treated as the passive recipients of these 
fixed objects.
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4. In addition to the student-centered discussions advocated by Rosenblatt, I 
have found collaborative student journals to be very effective in fostering an 
awareness of and a respect for the responses of others. I assign two students to 
one journal and for alternating classes, they are responsible for responding to 
their partner's previous comments and adding an entry for the reading due. 
These collaborative journals usually become a constructive conversation that 
encourages each participant to reconsider and reconstruct their initial 
responses recorded in the journal and elaborated during class discussions. 
With its ease and informality, email exchanges can replace the written pages 
of the paper journal, but it is the dialogic collaboration rather than its 
m edium  that is most important.
5. Richard Wright's frequently anthologized 'T he Man Who Was Almost A 
Man" is a good text with which to foster this reflexive examination of a 
reader's influential -- and socially influenced -  assumptions. A student's 
response to this story depends to a great degree on his or her prior beliefs 
about male maturation and individual responsibility. As the critic John 
Loftis explains, this story parodies the traditional tale of masculine initiation 
through hunting. Unlike William Faulkner's character Ike McCaslin, 
W right's protagonist Dave Sanders, the son of an African-American share­
cropper, is denied an initiation into manhood through learning to use a 
weapon from an older male mentor (Loftis 437-442). If a reader interprets 
Dave's impulsive acquisition of a gun and his accidental shooting of a mule 
based on those traditional expectations for male maturity and individual 
responsibility, then this seventeen year old is deemed an immature youth as 
some of my students respond. Dave's decision to flee the humiliation and 
the exploitation of the exorbitant price he must pay for the dead farm animal 
then seems to be final proof of his immaturity. Yet this interpretation ignores 
the ambiguity of the title that asserts as well as qualifies Dave's manhood, and 
it overlooks the poignancy of the final line describing his departure for 
"someplace, someplace where he could be a man." For Dave has not come of 
age in a community that provides models for his maturation. He instead is 
"treated like mule" from whom little assertiveness is tolerated. His father, 
for example, accedes to the landlord's exorbitant charge and forces Dave to 
subm it as well. The father's acquiescence and the mother's ulterior motive 
for the gun purchase — defense against racial violence -- suggest the 
inappropriateness of traditional standards of masculinity. If students pursue 
this story's widening circles of interest to understand the Post-Reconstruction 
era of share-cropping and Klan lynchings, then Dave's actions will be judged 
to be more a matter of racist exploitation than personal maturation. By 
placing the student's individual beliefs within a cultural context, the 
appropriateness and the validity of these assumptions can be examined.
6. An increasing amount of scholarship has begun to call into question the 
categorization of Murray and Elbow as neo-Romantic 'expressivists." In 
addition to the articulation of Dewey's tacit tradition by Newkirk and others, 
Stephen Fishman and Lucille McCarthy in "Is Expressivism Dead?" and
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Sherrie Gradin in Romancing Rhetorics have questioned the usual reading 
of Romanticism as an asocial attempt at self-expression.
7. Murray, for example, states that a "writer must plan and calculate, scheme 
and decide . . . makfe] a thousand executive decisions," and cognitive 
researchers, led by Linda Flower and John Hayes, have sought to create a 
mental model of this decision-making process (Wri ter  6). Despite Murray's 
own divisive title to 'Teach Writing as a Process, Not Product," the writing 
process movement can itself be seen as a development of as much as a 
departure from current-traditional teaching. W riting process instruction 
made the methods of skillful product-oriented writers accessible to more 
students, especially those whose family discourse differed from the middle 
class language privileged by schools. The writing process movement, led by 
Murray and Elbow, should be considered a democratization of the academy, it 
is no coincidence that the attention to process parallels open admission 
policies.
8. Although writing process theorists are accused of offering a simplistic 
account of agency, Murray actually foreshadows the postmodern problem 
when he describes "being led by a piece" of writing (Expecting 141). Murray 
assumes language's influence upon thought and suggests a way beyond the 
current impasse when he conceives of writers as agents who "us[e| written 
language to find out what they have to say" (Learning 31). As Dewey 
explains, agency is possible by examining language's tremendous effect upon 
thought.
9. First-order thinking, Elbow elaborates, involves "constructing new words 
from experience" and the second entails "constructing new experiences from 
words" (Embracing 33). Sounding like Dewey, Elbow does not draw this 
distinction without adding the disclaimer, "Of course, there is a continuum" 
between these complementary ways of thinking, yet he insists "we can still 
usefully treat them separately" (Embracing 14,15).
10. As many contemporary composition instructors urge their students to 
seek greater agency, I believe we must be very forthright about its 
consequences. Pragmatist knowledge demands action so Brian would have to 
risk his own, sometimes tenuous, social acceptance if he were to defend his 
homosexual friend against ridicule or worse abuse. He would have to weigh 
the importance of his own immediate acceptance against the eventual 
consequences for himself, Todd, and a homophobic student. Although I 
would want Brian and any other student to defend another classmate like 
Todd and become even more deliberate agents of social reform, I think 
we need to be very honest about the possible consequences of such agency 
and our own personal willingness to accept them.
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CHAPTER V
100
TOWARDS A SYNTHESIS OF WRITING PROCESS 
AND POSTMODERN INSTRUCTION:
THE DEWEYAN DIRECTION
"A deconstructive reading of writing pedagogy underscores the 
appropriateness of much of the lore connected with process
pedagogy [and] demonstrates . . .  some alterations
remain to be considered." -- Sharon Crowley
"It takes nothing away from [postmodern] theorists to say that 
sensible writing teachers were implementing some aspects 
of their theories in the classroom before the theories 
were . . .  articulated." -- Edward White
When postmodern composition theorists explain the classroom 
implications of Derrida and Foucault, I'm usually struck by the fact that the 
practices proposed resemble, and quite closely, the best aspects of Murray's 
and Elbow's pragmatist pedagogies. Teaching writing as a process, beginning 
with student experiences, constructing knowledge from these experiences, 
engaging in collaboration between writers and readers, acknowledging 
language's influence, and trying on as well as taking off various ways of 
believing all are proposed as though no one else had ever advanced these 
ideas, or if they did, Murray or Elbow must have mumbled these insights. In 
A Teacher's Guide to Deconstruction, Sharon Crowley, for example, describes 
a deconstructive pedagogy that "would reinforce the notion . . . that writing is 
a process" yet "interpret this slogan more profoundly" (46). By claiming to 
interpret "more profoundly" what previously was only "a slogan," Crowley 
shows with one hand and conceals with the other a significant similarity
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
between her Derridean pedagogy and those of Murray and Elbow.
Crowley's profound interpretation of the writing process is to deny the 
existence of any universal methods of composing and to assert 'This does not 
mean that the writing process can not be generalized about" (46). Her 
generalizations, however, are very familiar to a practitioner of Murray's and 
Elbow's theories. For example, she states " On the deconstructive account (and 
in process pedagogy as well) writing is conceived as continuous and dynamic" 
(41). Based on Derrida's deconstuction of the author, the writing process is 
"continuous" since it is impossible to discern when composing exactly begins 
and ends. Composing also must be considered "dynamic" because it entails 
endless collaboration and revision. By her parenthetical inclusion of "process 
pedagogy," Crowley admits yet minimizes these similarities; her parentheses 
symbolize her attempted marginalization of Murray and Elbow.
Crowley tries to conflate writing process theorists and current- 
traditionalists by claiming, "a deconstructive analysis undermines the notion 
that the composing begins with an originating author; this notion 
characterizes both traditional and process pedagogies" (31). 1 In contrast to 
these pedagogies, her deconstructive instruction would demonstrate the 
"complicity" of writers and readers to disrupt the foundational concept of an 
author (36). Students would "read their colleagues' works-in-progress and 
comment on them" so they would become "as much a part of their 
composition as is the 'original' author" (37-8). But the "complicity" of writers 
and readers Crowley claims for her deconstructive pedagogy closely resembles 
the individual-social dialectic enacted by Elbow's peer response groups. For 
Elbow is well aware that a writer "can't give readers a finished product . . . 
anymore than a playwright can actually send a live play through the mail"
(W W P  315). Crowley's related assertion that a Derridean instructor would
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teach students to anticipate "the probable responses of the audience" again 
resembles Murray's concept of the writer's other self 04 Teacher's 42). Once 
Elbow's and Murray's emphasis on the writer is not considered according to 
their critics' e ither/o r thinking about the individual and the social, their 
emphasis on the writer's process can be interpreted "more profoundly" than 
"a slogan."
In a similar analysis of Foucault's pedagogical implications, Kurt 
Spellmeyer concludes, student writers must learn to seek "knowledge made" 
rather than "knowledge received" (724). Students must start to "ask questions 
for which no answers or containing forms wait ready at hand" (723). Thev 
must -- dare I paraphrase, but whom? — write to learn, and when they do, 
Spellmeyer continues, they will "speak first and then learn what [they] have 
said and whom [they] have become" (723). Yet Murray has been categorized as 
an 'expressivist7 for advocating writing to learn which is "not so much self- 
expression as self-exposure, and perhaps self-creation" (Learning 137). Like 
Bizzell criticizing Flower and Hayes' cognitive research, I find these 
postmodern pedagogies to be "a surprising mix of daunting complexity and 
disappointing familiarity" (Bizzell "Cognition" 222). 2
Although Crowley and Spellmeyer, in theory, declare the social 
construction of knowledge, they seem determined, in practice, to draw a 
line in the sand between the "old" that includes 'expressivism' and their 
supposedly "new" pedagogies. These pedagogies, I will prove, include 
something borrowed and something old as much as something new so a 
pragmatist synthesis of their most effective practices and those of writing 
process pedagogies is possible. Like Dewey and Elbow, I want to reconstruct 
an e ither/o r opposition into a bo th /and  dialectic that eliminates the possible 
failures of each of these presently opposed pedagogies.
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Beginning with the Primacy of Experience
The Deweyan direction for contemporary composition begins with the 
primacy of experience already enacted by Murray and Elbow. At a time when 
New Criticism made most English departments "institution[sj of literary 
studies unresponsive to student lives," writing process theorists "encouraged 
students to write what mattered to them" (Jarratt 109). Like Murray, Elbow' 
and  Crowley, a Deweyan instructor would continue encouraging students 
to select "issues that concern them directly" (Crowley Teacher's 38). These 
topics, however, would not be limited to such personal events as the big 
game and the broken friendship as some misguided writing process 
practitioners and their critics assume. Instead these issues of direct concern 
would be any topic with which students have enough experience and interest 
to seek greater understanding. In my composition course, such topics have 
included the everyday use of lasers, the thrills of reading fantasy literature, 
and the identity problems of birarial adolescents. When students use familiar 
language to write about these self-selected subjects, I, like Macrorie, have 
found their writing reveals "a surprising occasional command of metaphor, 
forceful beginnings and endings, telling detail, word play, [and] irony" 
(Macrorie Up taught 22). Yet the success and the possible failure of Macrorie's 
pedagogy demonstrates a pragmatist composition teacher would not rely on 
student experiences completely.
Macrorie named his pedagogy the 'T hird  Way" because he wanted to 
avoid the first two alternatives created by the e ither/or thinking that pits 
teacher control against student liberty (Uptaught 27). To achieve the third 
possibility of student freedom fostered by teacher direction, Macrorie 
provided the student with "first, freedom, to find his voice and let his 
subjects find him; and second, discipline, to learn more professional craft to
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supplement his already considerable language skills" (telling viii). Instead of 
"complete freedom," this pedagogy sought Dewey's positive freedom as a 
student learns to do more, to write better with an instructor's guidance 
(Uptaught 27). Yet the possible failure of this student-centered and teacher- 
directed pedagogy shows that Macrorie's concern for h o w  students write 
should not eliminate entirely the previous concentration on what students 
compose.
To avoid the "bloated, pretentious" prose he ridiculed as "Engfish," 
Macrorie dem anded writing that is "alive and honest enough to be 
dangerous" (Uptaught 21, 27). This demand was successful, as even 
Macrorie's critic James Vopat states, because a student was engaged in 
"asserting the worth of his own experience and feelings . . . .  [writing] honestly 
about actual event and emotional reaction" (41-2). Yet when an instructor's 
concern for process does not include teaching students how professional 
writers use this experiential immediacy to reach analytical insights, Vopat 
warns, "the student-centered class places such a prem ium  on personal truth, 
that there is a tendency to encourage and reward the sensational rush at the 
expense of the considered response" (42). Macrorie's college textbook telling 
writing  does include chapters on 'Tightening," "Sharpening," and "Writing 
Critically," but it does not include sample texts by published authors to 
demonstrate the results of such revision and reflection. Without these 
exemplary products, the textbook's sections on revision and analysis were not 
effective for Vopat's students. They wrote "well and excitedly about their 
personal experiences," but they were "at a loss when asks to write about ideas, 
when asked to question values" (42). Vopat's prescient warning means that a 
composition course ultimately will fail if it begins and ends with only  the 
primacy of experience. Like Elbow, a Deweyan instructor would encourage
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both  discourse that renders and  discourse that analyzes.
W ithout exaggerating the primacy of experience, a pragmatist pedagogy 
also cannot overlook its importance. Unlike the postmodernists Berlin, 
Bartholomae, and Spellmeyer, a Deweyan instructor would not violate the 
starting point of pragmatist thought and writing process practice. In a revised 
presentation of his postm odern course, Berlin stresses the central importance 
of "the response of students to the materials and methods considered" and 
claims "We start with the personal experiences of the students" (Rhetorics 
115, 116). Unfortunately, Berlin's continued rhetoric of discursive oppression 
contradicts his pedagogy's supposed emphasis on experience because he still 
wants his students to "negotiate and resist these [cultural] codes, these 
hegemonic discourses" (Rhetorics 116). By advocating this pursuit of 
negative freedom from external constraints, Berlin creates the 
epistemological crisis faced by Foucault (as explained in chapter one). 
Subjecting all previous beliefs to doubt denies an individual the necessary 
context in which a non-foundational knower considers the alternatives for a 
particular assertion.
Similar to Berlin, Spellmeyer requires a student to resist the dominant 
discourse because the Foucauldian "I speaks only  in those moments when it 
overcomes the rules designed to contain it" (716, italics added). This 
postmodern assumption that student essays generally are written by 
discursive practices leads Bartholomae to respond to a student's initial drafts 
by doubting rather than believing the account of her experiences. He declares, 
"I begin by not granting the writer her 'own' presence in [a| paper . . . .  by 
asking her to read her paper as a text already written by the culture . . . .  I begin 
by being dismissive" ("Response" 85). By beginning with doubt and 
demanding a student start with resistance, a postmodern teacher induces the
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paralysis observed by Bizzell in Berlin's course (as explained in chapter one). 
For most students will resist this paralysis as much as, if not more than, the 
dom inant ideology, which may explain Bartholomae's belief that it is the 
teacher who must force students to question "the things that seem beyond 
question . . . .  It will not happened on its own, but only when prompted" 
("Response" 87).
Like France's call for critical intervention by an instructor, 
Bartholomae's "prompt[ing)" makes me ask Foucault's question of "Who is 
speaking?" Will it be the teacher or the student? Crowley criticizes 
traditional instruction because "the teachers do most of the writing in 
composition classes" through their syllabi, assignments, comments, and 
corrections (Teacher's 35). Yet Bartholomae only recognizes student writers 
as a speaking "I" if they "write against the grain of the [dominant! discourse" 
("Response" 85). Bartholomae, Berlin, and Spellmeyer define agency too 
much in terms of resistance, yet their conception of agency "dismisses" 
students' prior experiences so these writers are left in Foucault's 
epistemological crisis. A Deweyan instructor, in contrast, would conceive of 
agency as reconstruction as well as resistance. A pragmatist pedagogy would 
neither exaggerate, nor understate the primacy of experience. Then the 
similarity that John Schilb notes between "teachers who want their students 
to engage in personal, expressive writing" and "the attention to daily life that 
theorists of cultural studies have shown" can be fulfilled (187). Following 
Dewey's constructive process of inquiry, student writers would begin with 
experience then develop knowledge that could reconstruct as well as resist 
conventional beliefs.
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Dewey's Constructive Process From Experience to Knowledge
Since experience is James' "double-barrelled word," its primacy 
includes rather than precludes the construction of knowledge in a pragmatist 
pedagogy. To foster this process, a Deweyan instructor would have to be wary 
of the possible weakness of Macrorie's writing process theory: encouraging 
"the sensational rush" too much. Although prior experiences and present 
abilities "furnish the initiating . . . forces in all education," Dewey also 
cautions, "learning is not a matter of [theirl spontaneous flow" (Democracy 
133-34). By placing a prem ium  on emotional rendering, Macrorie does not 
encourage the constructive process of knowing enough. And when students 
do not write to learn, Murray and Spellmeyer agree, "writing [isj drudgery, 
something that has to be done after the thinking is over" and "writing can 
never be more than a mechanical reproduction" (Murray Expecting 3-4, 
Spellmeyer 726). To foster "the considered response," a Deweyan instructor 
would ask students to select meaningful topics that represent "questions to 
which [they] need answers, problems to which [they} can use solutions, [and| 
situations [they] need to . .  . explore" (Murray W rite  29).
As creative tensions, these topics for inquiry would be resolved by 
pursuing Dewey's constructive process from felt difficulty through problem 
definition, hypothesis formation, and deliberate experimentation to 
provisional verification. Like Murray and Elbow, a Deweyan instructor 
would teach composing as an understandable process that progresses — 
recursively, of course -- from collecting to clarifying and involves believing 
and doubting. 3 Similar to Murray and Elbow's preference for the first- 
person essay, a pragmatist teacher would emphasize a writer's active 
participation in the construction of meaning. Dewey's non-foundational 
philosophy denies that an individual is a passive spectator of the known, yet
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the pragmatist emphasis upon a knower's activity does not mean this process 
always must produce an original discovery.
Dewey clarifies an instructor's commitment to "write to learn" when 
he explains, learning "should take place under such conditions that from the 
standpoint of the learner there is genuine discovery" (Democracy 354). From 
the perspective of the student writer, "this thinking is original" because she 
is making meaning which has "not been previously apprehended . . . even 
though everybody else in the world knows it" (Democracy 187). Like the text 
for Rosenblatt's reader, meaning for a pragmatist writer must be made anew 
since knowledge does not exist as a fixed, foundational entity.
As Dewey advises, a pragmatist teacher would place the composing 
process "on the [samej level of importance as. . . [its| ends," the written 
product (Quest 279). This instructor would not invert the previous hierarchy 
and privilege process over product because one false dualism should not be 
avoided only to be replaced by another. To stress the writing process, Murray 
risked such replacement early in his career when he asserted "teach writing as 
a process, not product" and "Process can not be inferred from product any 
more than a pig can be inferred from a sausage" (Learning 14, 18). 4 One of 
the implications of "teaching writing as a process," Murray concludes, is 'T he  
text of the writing course is the student's writing" so the texts of published 
authors were excluded from the classroom -  or so it seemed (Learning 16).
For Murray states another implication: "Papers are examined to see 
what other choices the writer might make" which reveals the 
deconstructionst's supplement in the binary opposition of process over 
product (Learning 17). An instructor's awareness of "other choices" involves 
her knowledge of published texts as well as other student writings and so 
these texts were never really excluded from the classroom. To make students
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more aware of those alternatives, sample essays by published authors have 
been reintroduced into most writing process classrooms. Even at such 
bastions of 'expressivism' as Murray's University of Mew Hampshire, the 
expulsion of published texts ended more than a decade ago. 5 Dewey's 
definition of a target explains the relationship between a product and a 
process because "a target is not the future goal of [a shot]; it is the centering [or 
aiming] factor in a present shooting" (Democracy 206). And the contingent 
quality of these targets must be remembered because these products, like 
language for Murray, "evolve . . . rules are not what writers do, but what 
writers have done" (Learning 151).
Given the tentative nature of pragmatist truths, an instructor cannot 
always ensure the validity of a desired outcome in advance. As a Deweyan 
instructor "involve[s] himself in [a student's] . . . exploration" as Murray 
recommends, future verification cannot be assured, only assumed (Learning 
132). An instructor, therefore, should not let his greater knowledge of 
alternative products, especially the preferred ones, make him intervene too 
directly in a student's constructive process. A pragmatist pedagogy, like its 
writing process precursors, would remove "the teacher from the center of the 
classroom," and this de-centering Jarratt notes, can also be considered "a 
postmodern move, in the sense that the teacher [previously] was taken as the 
locus of a Truth" (109). Yet as Dewey stipulates, "When [a teacher's] external 
authority is rejected, it does not follow that all authority should be rejected," 
and Murray confirms, "student-centered does not mean permissive" (EE 21, 
Learning 133).
Rather than recenter the classroom on students only, a pragmatist 
teacher would try to maintain a dual focus upon the subject matter as well as 
students experiences (EE 56). As David Russell explains, Dewey believes an
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instructor "must consciously and carefully interweave the interest of the 
learner with the demands of the discipline" (187). A pragmatist teacher's 
knowledge of composition studies would inform the first focus on the 
subject, but unlike a traditional teacher, an instructor would make not try to 
transfer this knowledge directly. Instead this knowledge of the discipline 
would serve as a part of the "working resources" for a Deweyan instructor to 
create educative experiences for composition students (Democracy 214). 
Students, for example, will learn about freewriting and language's influence 
when these "general methods" help a writer "siz[e[ up the needs, resources, 
and difficulties" of resolving a particular problem (Democracy 202). When 
students try to write to learn about problematic topics, freewriting will be 
useful to collect ideas and reflect on their significance; and during this 
reflection, understanding language's tremendous effect will have a 
"constructive value" (Democracy 354). Through this manipulation of the 
external factors of learning, such as by encouraging the selection of 
problematic topics, a Deweyan instructor can stimulate students' growth. 
Murray sums up the authority of a pragmatist teacher when he advises, "In 
teaching the [writing! process, we have have to look not at what students 
need to know, but what they need to experience" (Learning 25).
It is the postmodern emphasis on revolutionary critique of presumably 
oppressive discourses that make France and Berlin so eager to intervene in 
the results of a student's constructive process. France, for example, wants to 
predetermine that a student writer will conclude incarceration should not be 
primarily punitive, but by predetermining a student's resistance to 
imprisonment as punishment, this student's active participation is thwarted. 
Yet, "If the [constructive process] has worked in our case," Dewey asks, "how 
can we assume that the method will not work with our students?" (qtd. by
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Westbrook 507). Berlin hopes that his postmodern course will enable 
students "to bring about more democratic arrangements" (Rhetorics 116). Yet 
his pedagogy is predicated on declaring the dominant ideology undemocratic. 
The premium placed on resistance — if 1 may allude to Vopat's criticism of 
Macrorie — rewards revolutionary criticism at the expense of reconstruction. 
A Deweyan instructor would approve of a student's effort to reconstruct a 
generally accepted assertion and to understand its validity. A student's 
reconstruction of the American ideal of democracy, for example, would be 
valued by a pragmatist teacher just as much as a critique of its current 
imperfections. Berlin, however, would value the second at the expense of the 
first because of his emphasis on resistance against conventional beliefs. Yet 
this revolutionary emphasis can curtail a student's constructive process and 
prevent the development of any critically understood belief. A Deweyan 
instructor would avoid intervention which curtails a student's constructive 
process -- even when a questionable meaning has been asserted.
Like the contemporary writing process theorist Lad Tobin, a Deweyan 
instructor should realize a students' need "to get detail down on paper, write 
her way through that phase before she can (or dares to) shape it [and] interpret 
it" ("Personal" 162). By encouraging discourse that renders like Elbow, an 
instructor may have to read results that he finds objectionable. Tobin, for 
example, felt moral dismay towards one student's topic, but he approached a 
student named 'T im " with "disarming . . . empathy" rather than 
Bartholomae's ideological dismissal ("Personal" 173). In his essay, Tim 
described his cat and mouse encounters with one store owner from whom he 
repeatedly shoplifted merchandise. Instead of immediately dismissing the 
masculine bravado of this anti-social defiance of authority, Tobin asks Tim 
conference questions posed "with curiosity and without judgment" that
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would further his construction of meaning, and this student was able to
construct further knowledge about his struggles with male authority,
especially that of his father, and his confusion about the collapse of his
nuclear family ("Personal" 173, 174-5). By stimulating a student's further
construction of meaning, a Deweyan instructor can fulfill the suggestion by
another postmodernist John Clifford that
students want to become writers . . . .  because they are convinced they 
have something to say, and more importantly, somebody to say it to. 
They want an audience they can trust, one that encourages them . . .  to 
look carefully at the social contingencies of family, religion, gender, and 
class that have shaped their unique histories. (46)
As Tobin fulfills Clifford's suggestion, the divisive barrier between writing 
process and postmodern pedagogies collapses. By assuming that the 
constructive process will work for our students, a Deweyan instructor can 
encourage a student's active participation in this process w ithout anyone 
assuming that the resulting knowledge is the product of an autonomous 
agent.
Through Individual-Social Transactions
SimiJar to her writing process and postmodern composition 
predecessors, a pragmatist teacher would teach student writers to construct 
knowledge within an individual-social transactions because, for Dewey, 
learning is an "active undertaking! which involves mutual exchange" 
(Democracy 352). Like Murray and Elbow, an instructor would enact this 
dialectic through conference comments and peer responses so individual 
writers learn to acknowledge their social influences. Rather than respond to 
students' draft with the traditional "awk," a pragmatist teacher would offer 
conference comments and questions like 'This is exciting but I need a lot
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more. What did  you hear? What did you feel?" as Murray advises and Tobin 
demonstrates (Murray Learning 151, 155). By offering these provocative 
responses, a Deweyan instructor would teach students to develop a w riters 
"other self' who anticipates a reader's probable reactions. Using Elbow's peer 
response groups, an instructor again would teach students to "assume the 
point of view . . . [andi carry on an imagined dialogue with potential readers" 
which Crowley urges in her deconstructive pedagogy (Teacher's 36). After a 
response session, one of my students, for example, commented, "Her 
contributions . . . helped me to revise and add things I couldn't see in my own 
writing." Like Murray, Elbow, and Crowley, a pragmatist teacher would 
dispel the foundational concept of a text as a container for a writer's fixed 
meaning and reconceive the New Critical text as a collaborative site of 
meaning making by writers and readers.
Like Crowley, Edward White, another contemporary composition 
theorist, attributes this non-foundational conception of a text to postmodern 
thinkers, arguing "there is a basic correspondence between [post-structuralist] 
theories and the practices of the best writing teachers" (187). Yet he fails to 
notice pragmatism 's tacit tradition in the "very familiar ring" of postmodern 
theories for contemporary writing teachers (192). White links such practices as 
write to learn through successive drafts and collaborative conceptions of text 
to Derrida rather than Dewey. Yet composition instructors who "creatively] 
misread . . .  the drafts [they] receive" in order to perceive "possibilities as well 
as [finished] products" rely on Rosenblatt and Dewey as much as Derrida and 
the other postmodernists White credits (191). It is Rosenblatt who asserts a 
reader's active participation in constructing a literary text without denying a 
writer's contribution to the text the reader receives. And it is Dewey who 
explains an individual writer's constructive process without denying the
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influence of social transactions.
Beyond Murray's conference comments and Elbow's peer response 
groups, a pragmatist synthesis of writing process and postmodern pedagogies 
offers an instructor several other ways to engage an active knower in 
individual-social transactions. Like Bruce Ballenger and Kenneth Bruffee, a 
Deweyan instructor could encourage students to construct knowledge by 
researching what others believe about their topics. In The Curious Researcher 
and The I-Search Paper, Ballenger and Bruffee ask students to resolve a felt 
difficulty by writing researched essays. Unlike the traditional research paper, 
these essays encourage the use of the first person "I" while the writer's 
construction of knowledge involves not only the student's lived experience 
but the experience of others' beliefs too. To maintain the writer's active role, 
Ballenger asks students to engage in personal observation as well as 
traditional library research. Using Ballenger's approach, I have found that the 
non-traditional research helps to keep students actively involved and it 
transforms their often foundational notions of library sources. Students begin 
to consider the 'facts found in books' as assertions constructed by other 
researchers like themselves. As constructed knowledge, the information 
gathered by library and non-traditional research can be questioned and used to 
question the writer's initial beliefs.
Like William Coles and David Bartholomae, a Deweyan instructor 
could design learning sequences that enact individual-social transactions in 
even more direct collaborations with other students. In The Plural I and 
Facts, Counterfacts, and Artifacts (co-authored with Anthony Petrosky), Coles 
and Bartholomae create a sequence of assignments that require students to 
write, read and respond to shared essays examining a common topic. 
Through such collaborative inquiry, these writers fulfill Dewey's concept of
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education as "a constant reorganizing or reconstructing of experience" that is 
neither an unfolding from within, nor a forming from without (Democracy 
89). Through all of these collaborative practices, a Deweyan instructor would 
"prolong discursive tension" and "encourage . . . critical reflection on the 
knowledge produced" as Spellmeyer recommends (727). Yet a pragmatist 
teacher also would ask an individual to consider the less obvious influences 
of language itself.
To engage a w riter in a transactional relationship with language, a 
Deweyan instructor would encourage a student to examine discursive 
practices as positive as well as negative influences. As described in chapter 
four, a pragmatist teacher would extend the reflection within Murray's first 
person essay by asking the student to consider not just the significance of the 
experience but also the cultural assumptions implicit in the narrative. The 
purpose of this extended reflection is not to dismiss the student or to deny the 
writer but to widen the circles of interest. This attention to social influences, 
of course, can occur much earlier in the composing process. Like Elbow, a 
Deweyan instructor also would use freewriting to expose as well as to exploit 
language's own "generative powers." An instructor, for example, could ask 
Tobin's student Tim, after an early freewrite for his essay, to consider the 
cultural models for his conflicts with male authority figures. This question 
would not be asked to curtail a student's constructive process but to continue 
it by clarifying the experience. If Tim were to relaize his shoplifting was 
replaying his relationship with his father and this defiance repeated a 
troubled teen, James Dean model of male rebellion, then he might consider 
why he was responding in this anti-social way and whether there are other 
possible responses. Such social reflection would widen Tim's interests from a 
narrative of shoplifting to an analysis of a male defiance that challenges his
115
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
father as much as the store owner. Although student may take this 
acknowledgment of social influences to mean "the individual [is] completely 
at the mercy of the dominant forces" as Rosenblatt warns, an instructor 
should ask these provocative questions to help an individual make more 
deliberate choices, to distinguish intelligent activity from routine actions as 
Dewey advises (Literature 254).
To help students make more deliberate choices about language, a 
Deweyan instructor also could engage students in the interpretive paraphrase 
activity created by one of the first social theorists, Ann Berthoff. In this 
activity, Berthoff asks students to offer one way of considering an idea, to 
paraphrase that first statement to create an alternative, then to examine the 
consequences of using this phrase versus that one (86). The differences 
between alternative ways of believing are especially noticeable as students try 
to write overtly persuasive essays. I, for example, use the sample topic of 
abortion (which so many students consider selecting) to show that so much 
depends upon the phrase 'the fetus conceived' or 'the unborn child' which 
many students uncritically employ. Rather than intuitively adopt one of 
these phrases, these writers can be asked to consider the rhetorical and logical 
implications of each phrase upon the larger issue of abortion. Instead of 
assuming a phrase that predetermines abortion is right or wrong, students 
can be encouraged to consider this central phrase and assumption of their 
essays. This consideration leads to further examination of the definition of 
life and the difficult weighing of all of the 'lives' involved. By considering 
the phrases used in persuasion, students can be lead from a foundational 
argument that tries to debate one issue in isolation to the non-foundational 
consideration of a topic foregrounded upon a network of other related and 
equally contingent beliefs.
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Because academic discourse is a central concern of their studies, 
students also can consider language's influence by examining this issue. 
Using the collaborative inquiry advocated by Coles and Bartholomae, a 
Deweyan instructor could start a learning sequence by asking students to 
freewrite about 'writing in college/ From this first writing about their 
experiences, students would begin constructing greater knowledge in the 
subsequent discussion during which the generally unknown term  of 
"academic discourse" would be introduced. After these initial activities, 
students would read and discuss several samples of academic discourse by 
their own classmates that are draw n from across the curriculum. As they look 
for similarities and differences among these samples, the students would try 
to compose collectively a definition of "academic discourse." The students 
then would read, discuss, and write responses to excerpts from recent 
scholarship on this issue (such as by Elbow, Bartholomae, Nancy Sommers, 
and Mike Rose). As Bartholomae advises, the students would learn to locate 
and explore their 'personal feelings' in the larger context of others' 'published 
knowledge' ("Inventing" 152). By contextualizing their developing beliefs, the 
students would compose academic discourse about "academic discourse" 
itself. When I followed this sequence of assignments in my composition 
course, I found that many of my students remain wary of disciplinary jargon, 
yet several realize that the specialized term "academic discourse" galvanizes 
their previously unarticulated intuitions about this issue. As one of my 
students wrote, "Until now I never understood why I've struggled to write 
college papers, but after the readings and the discussions [on academic 
discourse), I have a better idea of the differences between [personal and 
academic writing]." This student and others began to realize the powerful and 
often positive influence of discourse upon their thought so they could make
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deliberate choices between alternative practices. They began to achieve non- 
foundational agency.
Non-Foundational Agency Achieved
A pragmatist pedagogy would begin with the primacy of experience, 
foster the constructive process of knowing, and acknowledge language's 
tremendous effect in order to culminate with Dewey's intellectual disrobing. 
By trying on and taking off particular alternatives, an individual can learn to 
make deliberate choices between alternative beliefs and ways of believing. 
Like Carol Snyder, a Deweyan instructor could ask students to engage in 
historical research to appreciate the discursive choices that have been made 
already and their consequences. Through an adaptation of Foucault's 
genealogical studies, Snyder has created a researched essay that resembles 
those advocated by Balienger and Bruffee. Snyder begins by encouraging her 
students to question their, often foundational, assumptions about the 
classifications common to almost all academic discourses. To encourage these 
questions, Snyder, for example, asserts, "the products of our acts of classifying 
and dividing have only a historical reality," and she quotes the paleontologist 
Stephen Jay Gould, "Historical changes in classification are the fossilized 
indicators of conceptual revolution" (211). Then she provides the following 
questions to guide the students' analyses of specific classifications:
1) What is the object of the classification system?
2) What does the classification exclude or overlook?
3) Who has devised a n d /o r  employed these classifications?
4) When was this system devised a n d /o r modified?
5) Where was this classification system devised and where has it 
been used? (212-14, paraphrased)
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Snyder hopes these questions lead her students "to see that the classifications 
that order their disciplines are meaningful human inventions with 
significant effects" and they are "open to question and explanation, and thus 
by writing about them might lead to useful discoveries" (215). Unlike 
Foucault, Snyder does not imply that the discursive systems are external 
constraints from which one must seek an untenable escape.
Like a Deweyan instructor, she conceives of her students as individuals 
who can seek the positive freedom to act within complex discursive practices. 
She encourages her students to discover the benefits, flaws, exclusions, and 
possible alternatives of particular classification systems. Depending on the 
consequences of these discourses, these students can choose to accept, alter, 
reject, or replace these influential practices. By encouraging these historical 
examinations of discursive practices, a Deweyan instructor, like Snyder, 
would foster the trying on and taking off of particular ways of believing.
To foster Deweyan disrobing, an instructor could ask students to 
examine the contemporary as well as the historical diversity of discursive 
practices. Through a learning sequence similar to Elbow's "non-disciplinary" 
course, Kathleen McCormick and her colleagues at the University of Hartford 
encourage students to understand "a given subject as it has evolved over 
time" (1). After this historical research, students then examine some aspect of 
a common topic as "it is understood by different people in different ways 
today" (1). The ultimate assignment is to present a detailed analysis of the 
"range of contemporary perspectives on the subject and . . . their historical 
antecedents" then to assert a specific position which examines the 
"advantages and disadvantages of taking up one or another perspective" (17, 
18). Rather than "reporting" the knowledge of authorities, students are 
encouraged to "develop an authoritative voice" and use their knowledge "for
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a rhetorical purpose" (2). By weighing the "advantages and disadvantages" of 
each perspective as in BerthofPs interpretive paraphrasing, they consider the 
consequences of one way of believing versus another to establish an opionion 
and purpose "of [theirj own" (2). As they learn to practice this process of 
intellectual disrobing, these students are becoming non-foundational agents.
Pragmatic philosophy provides a comprehensive framework for 
creating a pedagogy for teaching student writers to be non-foundational 
agents. The Deweyan principles of the primacy of experience, the construction 
of knowledge, the acknowledgment of language's influences, and the critical 
disrobing of unexamined beliefs indicate a direction beyond the postmodern 
impasse because a pragmatist writer is neither an asocial individual pressing 
out an innate self, nor a passive occupant of prior subject positions. A 
pragmatist writer is an individual who has learned to construct beliefs from 
experience, to participate actively in individual-social transactions, and to 
examine "what [particular beliefs 1 are made of and what wearing them does" 
(EN  35). A pragmatist writer fulfills Dewey's assertion assertion that "the 
role of the individual . . . [is| the reconstruction of accepted beliefs" 
{Democracy 346). By this reconstruction of beliefs and ways of believing, a 
pragmatist writer is an individual whose identity is "in continuous 
formation"so it must be understood as "historic [and] temporally relative" 
(Democracy 408, EN 185). Lacking an identity fixed by either an innate self or 
a prior discursive position, the pragmatist writer can establish Murray's 
authentic or McCormick's authoritative voice, but this vital tone is a 
construction as contingent as any other pragmatist assertion. The current
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controversy over 'voice' can be resolved by rejecting the false dualism 
between experessivism's innate self and postmodernism 's subject positions.
Although Deweyan pragmatism can help resolve such current 
controversies as writing to learn, an instructor's intervention, and a student's 
voice, this non-foundational philosophy offers no final blueprint for a 
composition pedagogy; its commitment to continuous reconstruction forbids 
any attem pt to draw  one. As I have tried to synthesize the best aspects of 
writing process and postmodern instruction, there still must be great 
variation between actual pragmatist composition courses. A pragmatist 
pedagogy enacted by Murray probably would emphasize a writer's active 
participation in the construction of knowledge from experience. One by 
Elbow would stress exploiting and exposing language's tremendous effect 
through freewriting and peer responses. Another by Crowley would assert 
discursive influences sooner to hasten deliberate choices between alternative 
ways of believing. The grave danger for such variations is that one 
pragmatist principle would be stressed so much that it precludes the 
fulfillment of another. As Vopat's and Bizzell's criticisms demonstrate, a 
composition course should not, for example, emphasize what has been done 
- experience, or what may be desired - resistance, at the expense of constructed 
knowledge. Yet the current taxonomies of composition pedagogies encourage 
just such imbalances by categorizing expressivists who teach writing as an 
entirely individual act and social epistemicists who teach composing as a 
completely social process.
The brilliance of Deweyan pragmatism is its rejection of such false 
dualism s by reconceiving such fundamental philosophic terms as experience, 
knowledge, and language and considering them in a dynamic relationship 
instead of binary oppositions. When this difficult reconception is
121
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
understood on its own terms, then a pragmatist composition pedagogy is 
possible. Like philosophy for Dewey, contemporary composition studies 
then becomes a question of "what the known demands of us" (Democracy 
381). As I have articulated the resounding relevance of Dewey's tacit 
tradition, I have been able to understand better the efficacy of many aspects of 
Murray's and Elbow's writing process pedagogies that I already practice. The 
primacy of experience, for example, explains the importance of students' self­
selected topics, and the constructive process of knowing clarifies mv 
expectation for and my involvement with a student writing to learn. The 
influence of language upon thought will make me ask students (like Brian in 
chapter four) to extend the reflection within their personal essays. I will seek 
student reflection beyond the event's significance to its cultural context for 
those topics such analysis is appropriate and those writers ready for such 
further reflection. Rather than dem and every student writer resist the 
dominant discourses, I will try to seek Dewey's goal of grow th more 
consciously. For students composing the vague prose of Macrorie's Engfish, I 
will encourage them to render their experiences in greater and more vivid 
details. For other writers already engaged in extensive reflection, I will ask 
them to deliberately try on and take off different ways of believing and 
compare their consequences. I also want to prompt other composition 
scholars to take down the divisive barriers of "expressive" and "social 
epistemic" pedagogies. I plan to reconstruct the best aspects of these 
composition practices as a pragmatist theory of composition instruction, and I 
hope to inspire others to design and implement other, similar Deweyan 
pedagogies so we and our students can "think of [ourlselves as agents, not as 
ends" (Quest 276).
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CHAPTER FIVE NOTES
1. Similar to Crowley, many other other postmodern theorists try to conflate 
the current-traditional writer with that of writing process theories. Clifford, 
for example, asserts, 'T raditional and expressive rhetorical theory . . . 
unproblematicallv assumes that the individual writer is free, beyond the 
contingencies of history and language, to be an authrentic and unique 
consciousness," and his use of "theory" in the singular rather than the 
plural 'theories' conflates them completely. Faigley repeats this claim with an 
important qualification that when Murray states, "the writer is constantly 
learning from the writing what it intends to say," this statment "gestures 
towards a Derridean view of writing, where meaning is continuously 
deferred as added meanings displace earlier meanings. But Murray could not 
pursue such implications because he theorized the source of meaning in the 
mind of the individual writer" (Fragments 245, n.9 and see 225). But does the 
assertion that M urray's writer is conceived as an autonomous author reflect 
Murray's own belief that "once [students] start grappling — on the page -- with 
meanings, [instructors] can help them see how the traditions of form and 
language help clarify meaning" or his postmodern critics willingness to 
displace this belief and add on their attempted conflation with current- 
trad itionalism (Expecting 103)?
2. There are other similarities between the best aspects of writing process and 
postmodern composition instruction beyond considering w riting as a process, 
asking student writers to select personally meaningful topics, encouraging 
writing to learn, decentering the traditional classroom, advocating an 
instructor's involvement to further this process, and acknowledging the 
transactions between writers and readers. Crowley, for example, believes a 
deconstructive pedagogy would disrupt traditional teaching based on 
"generic categories," and Murray too advocates revising narrative prose into a 
poem or a first person essay into a more objective analysis (41). She also 
proposes, a deconstructive teachers "would sensitize their students to the 
institutional realities in which they write," and Elbow has urged teaching 
discourse variation to increase students' awareness of the "institutional 
realties" of academic discourses (47).
3. Although M urray's process 'ends' with clarifying, he has no illusion that 
absolute clarity is possible. Like Crowley, Murray considers the writing process 
to be endless; it ceases because time and motivation run out (see "The 
Maker's Eye").
4. Murray later softened this pig-sausage dichotomy between process and 
product by explaining that writers can "read within the page [of another 
writer] . . . bringing their own experience with their craft to illuminate the 
hidden craft of [that] writer" (Write 5, Expecting 63-4).
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5. One of my main assertions is not to deny that Murray can be categorized as 
an 'expressivist/ Instead it is that the best aspects of his pedagogy can be 
understood better by considering him from a pragmatist perspective. As 
shown by my reading of M urray's implications for "teaching writing as a 
process," Murray's writing process theory can be interpreted according to 
postmodern principles rather than those of New Criticism. The definitive 
interpretation known as 'expressivism' — offered by postmodernists -- can be 
deconstructed and  reconstructed into much more than naive neo- 
Romanticism. Murray can only be made to fit into the smooth, round hole 
labeled 'expressivism' when the multifacted, square edges of his theory are 
worn off.
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